LN1903 Debate question (NOT for the reason you're thinking)

[Smokeeaterpilot]

Hey I don't mean to beat a dead horse. But I recently spoke to an advanced collector of M1903s.

Now I don't want to get into the safe vs safe. Debate because that's a bit over done...

But while talking with this gentleman he brought up a very thought provoking point.

We all know the numbers of rifles produced as well as how many documented receiver failures there were documented in various sources including Hatcher's notebook.


Wouldn't there be a good cause to politically blow up this issue before the public in the WWI post war years? Typically during peacetime, especially following a war the military sees a significant reduction in funding for their budget due to the need the threat of war has been removed.

If you want to maintain your war production capabilities and justify funding in the post war peacetime era, how do you justify it to the Congressmen and Senators? You create a problem, crisis that needs immediate attention....

You need to completely revamp the whole production process which is going to require tooling, personnel, training and most importantly a non-stripped budget. So that way you don't lose your factory and workers.


Now I don't know if this is a dated argument or been done before. I haven't heard it before. But everything in government goes back to money. Could this LN debate been started by the War Department trying to hang onto its budget when the Armistice was signed?

I thought it was a thought provoking argument, I'm don't know if it holds water.

[mhb]

the problem was identified DURING the war, and the corrective measures were implemented at that time. SA introduced the new heattreatment in 1918, at around SN 800,000, and RIA actually ceased production for about six months (!) during the war, before re-commencing manufacture with the improved heattreatment at around SN 285,000.
All this is explained in 'Hatcher's Notebook', by MG Julian S. Hatcher, who was there at the time. If you have not read this book, you should certainly do so, because all the points of debate in the following years (until the present, in fact), are explained in such detail that there should really be no remaining reason for doubt.

mhb - Mike

[Col. Colt]

You guys are projecting the Modern Politicians (Liberal, Progressive, Lying, etc.) EVIL on people of a MUCH more honorable time. It was not a post war issue, as mhb points out.

If it wasn't a REAL problem, and it was decided to be a serious one by the using Service - the UNITED STATES ARMY ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT (not civilian politicians) - you sure as hell would not cut down the supply of rifles during a hot shooting war.... Lives were at stake - and everybody knew somebody who was involved. That would have been Treason. The problem was solved during the War, fixes implemented, production resumed and we moved on, nothing left to see here. No longer an issue, post 1918. CC

[Rick the Librarian]

It was actually an embarrassment for the Ordnance Depart, right in the middle of the time they needed rifles so desperately. Had M1917 production been ramping up, they would have REALLY been in a pickle.

[louis]

Politicians were not so honorable even back then but I happen to agree with Mike Rick and Colt

[Southron]

Well, lets think this thing through-

IF the "Low Number Springfield Rifle Blow Up Scandal" was a plot by either the Ordnance Department OR the U.S. Army to insure more funding from the Congress for both Springfield and Rock Island after the end of World War I, then it would have been a very, very "Counterproductive" political ploy.

WHY? Well, the heat treating screw up would have been the best argument for closing down both "Government Owned and Operated" Springfield Armory and Rock Island and turning over all small arms manufacturing responsibilities to private armories. After all, Winchester, Remington and Eddystone produced millions of U.S. M1917 Rifles WITHOUT any "lousy heat treatment, rifles blowing up" problems compared to Springfield and Rock Island.

Most professional officers in the military services during World War I realized that when the war was over, all the military services would be shrunk back down to their Peace time strength and appropriations from the Congress would be limited.

What no one anticipated was the post war Senator Nye and his Senate Committee investigations of the "Merchants of Death." This was a Conspiracy Theory that alleged the J.P. Morgan bank and all the arms manufacturers had conspired together to get the United States involved in World War I so they could reap huge profits off of war time contracts with the government.

Matter of fact, DuPont was so "burned" by Nye's reckless allegations in the 1930's about their role in World War I; when they were approached secretly to work on the Manhattan Project [the development of the Atomic Bomb] during World War II, they only reluctantly agreed and then insisted in the contract for their participation in the Manhattan Project that their profit would be limited to $1.00!

http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/merchants_of_death.htm

[John Beard]

If low number rifles were so dangerous as most have alleged, then why didn't the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps scrap and replace their low number rifles as well during overhaul? Surely their rifles were no stronger or more reliable than those in the Army.

If low number rifles were so dangerous as most have alleged, then why did Army Ordnance suspend scrappage of low number receivers a full year before Pearl Harbor and U.S. entry into WWII?
Are we to suppose that time cured the problem and strengthened the receivers?

Food for thought.

J.B.

[PhillipM]

You guys are projecting the Modern Politicians (Liberal, Progressive, Lying, etc.) EVIL on people of a MUCH more honorable time.

Study the reason Crozier didn't allow our Army to be equipped with the Lewis gun and get back to me.

[Major Tom]

If any of you have LN 1903 rifles you are afraid of shooting......send them to me, I'll pay the shipping cost.

[louis]

It truly makes one wonder why the Marine Corps accepted these rifles and fired them on Guadalcanal, rifle ranges etc. with no problem. I personally have no problem with them especially since I collect USMC 03's

[Fred]

Man, I'd like to see photos of your USMC 03's

[jgaynor]

Hey I don't mean to beat a dead horse. But I recently spoke to an advanced collector of M1903s.

Now I don't want to get into the safe vs safe. Debate because that's a bit over done...

But while talking with this gentleman he brought up a very thought provoking point.

We all know the numbers of rifles produced as well as how many documented receiver failures there were documented in various sources including Hatcher's notebook.


Wouldn't there be a good cause to politically blow up this issue before the public in the WWI post war years? Typically during peacetime, especially following a war the military sees a significant reduction in funding for their budget due to the need the threat of war has been removed.

If you want to maintain your war production capabilities and justify funding in the post war peacetime era, how do you justify it to the Congressmen and Senators? You create a problem, crisis that needs immediate attention....

You need to completely revamp the whole production process which is going to require tooling, personnel, training and most importantly a non-stripped budget. So that way you don't lose your factory and workers.


Now I don't know if this is a dated argument or been done before. I haven't heard it before. But everything in government goes back to money. Could this LN debate been started by the War Department trying to hang onto its budget when the Armistice was signed?

I thought it was a thought provoking argument, I'm don't know if it holds water.

It doesn't hold water. I have a copy of a report prepared by the individual responsible for all ordnance procurement in ww1. Ordnance was canceling munitions contracts before the ink on the armistice was hardly dry.

Besides there was no need to focus on the low numbers. Ordnance and the Army had their eyes on a semi auto MBR by the mid 20's at which point ALL the bolt action rifles would become, at best, substitute standard.

[Col. Colt]

Gentlemen, it is a problem that is NOT a problem - until YOUR Low Number grenades in your hands. And it may never do that - or it might with the next round. Thus people get fatalistic and choose to pretend there is no problem. And the US pre-WWII and WWII military establishment could not afford to throw away what might be good rifles just at the start of the next World War. The Marines overhauled LN rifles, and directed that they not be used for firing rifle grenades.

Go to the section in Brophy's Springfield book and read about the overall LN heat treatment problem - and look at the pictures of the fractured recievers vs. the bent but unbroken double heat treated units in testing. Read in Hatcher's Notebook - Hatcher tells of striking the reciever rail of a LN and the reciever breaking "like Glass"! I remember one account of someone dropping a LN reciever - and it shattered.

This is NOT a phony, manufactured problem. It was scientifically investigated, proven, and a fix instituted. The Armory System did not fail - it just relied on ancient "eyeballing" methods of heat treating too long instead of changing to using instruments until a problem was identified with the old method. If fixed that. End of discussion. Private companies have Labor strikes at inopertune times, and cut corners to make more money. The lack of a US Army controlled Armory Test routine caused the initial failure of the M16 in Vietnam. Colt reengineered the M16 on the fly, to their credit. The US Armory System built a LOT of Excellent guns during it's life.

Most LN M1903s are undoubtably fine and strong - but there is simply NO WAY of KNOWING the condition of any individual LN reciever. As with life in general, proceed on your own Judgment, at your own Risk! CC

[Smokeeaterpilot]

Wait a second. Not diminishing the safety of the LN1903s. Now what I was throwing out there....

I may be looking into the wrong area but.... I can't find in my copy of Hatcher's notebook where it covers the number of personnel in the post war years. Consider this... in the pre-war years 97 officers worked for the ordnance department. By the end of the war 5,800 officers and (72,720 civilian clerks). Following every war a stage of demilitization follows. The Defense department and war munitions funding sees a drastic reduction. If you're in the military do you want to go back to the pre-war years? The problem of LN1903s was solved. BUT how many much of a reduction in personnel and funding did the Ordnance Department see. The board that recommended scrapping all LN recievers, I read came from a Springfield Amory board. If you scrap those rifles, you need to replace them (ie manufacture new ones, furthermore "you need us to make new ones!")

The point I was getting at is with anything regarding the government is a giant chess match of obtaining Congressional funding. Since the people who made their recommendations came from the Ordnance Department (not a third party and to me that's HUGE) they had a vested interest in justifying their existence and their funding to solve the problem so they would not see a reduction. I'm sure they saw a reduction, but did this issue help prevent a scaling back even further. Did it protect their interests as employees at Ordnance Department?

Hatcher's notebook covers the mellurgy in detail. But there's gotta be more to the story. Politics and the chess match.

Put yourself in a high ranking ordnance department official or General's position....

Are you gonna say "nah we got this. Go ahead and scale us down, the war is over, we'll just crank out whatever we can and start replacing units as we can with whatever you give us." Or are you going to a serious issue worse to maintain your Congressional funding? Again on Capital Hill with a Budget committee this is a giant chess match as I see it.


Now I don't have the numbers with respect to how far back the Ordnance department was scaled after WWI.

But if I did, whether or not this argument holds water would come from what was recommended in their initial budget/funded positions and what they ended up with after this investigation.

On a personal note I'm a government worker. We do this all day long. Whenever there's a budget problem, you have to play games with government officials so you don't lose funding. Hatcher's notebook to me leaves much to be desired in my eyes. I'm sure there's more to the story...


Again, I'm not coming up with a conclusion. It was a fascinating argument I have yet to see anything that really addresses the motivation behind it and if it holds water.

[Johnny P]

The total number of receivers that failed will never be known. The failures occurred from the first rifles manufactured right up through the time the new heat treatment was put into use. The failures had been occurring for years before Hatcher was assigned the job of determining the cause. It was not a failure of the design, but a manufacturing defect, and being a manufacturing defect there was no way of knowing which receivers were brittle and which ones were not until they failed.

[Johnny P]

Prior to the end of WWI the U.S. Military had issued contracts for 3,025,000 Model 1911 pistols in addition to those already being supplied by Colt. Of that number Remington-UMC delivered something under 22,000 pistols. Virtually as soon as the war ended the contracts were cancelled. Colt's contract was also cancelled at the same time, and no more pistols were ordered until 1924, when 10,000 were ordered.

[jgaynor]

{snip}
Hatcher's notebook covers the mellurgy in detail. But there's gotta be more to the story. Politics and the chess match.

Put yourself in a high ranking ordnance department official or General's position....

Are you gonna say "nah we got this. Go ahead and scale us down, the war is over, we'll just crank out whatever we can and start replacing units as we can with whatever you give us." Or are you going to a serious issue worse to maintain your Congressional funding? Again on Capital Hill with a Budget committee this is a giant chess match as I see it.



The most important consideration in this argument is the simple fact that rifle production and the costs there of, were a mere pimple on the ass of all the WW1 US ordnance expenditures.

PS I hate to digress into the technicalities of the '03 failures but some of the same old misunderstandings are still being repeated today.
1. The weak receiver issue had NOTHING to do with heat treatment. A tiny percentage of receivers were "burned" in the forge shop. Those were the weak ones.
2 Forge temperatures were judged by eye until pyrometers were mandated. When the receivers went for heat treatment they were packed inside closed containers filled with charcoal. Eyeballing receivers during heat treatment was impossible.

[Smokeeaterpilot]

The most important consideration in this argument is the simple fact that rifle production and the costs there of, were a mere pimple on the ass of all the WW1 US ordnance expenditures.

PS I hate to digress into the technicalities of the '03 failures but some of the same old misunderstandings are still being repeated today.
1. The weak receiver issue had NOTHING to do with heat treatment. A tiny percentage of receivers were "burned" in the forge shop. Those were the weak ones.
2 Forge temperatures were judged by eye until pyrometers were mandated. When the receivers went for heat treatment they were packed inside closed containers filled with charcoal. Eyeballing receivers during heat treatment was impossible.


I'm not arguing the either way with regards to the "pimple on the ass" on how much rifle production took up of the ordnance department's budget.

What I'm saying is I don't have the data to argue it one way or another. But I'm not sure producing the standard service rifle for the entire US military would be small. Now it may be small with regards to all ordnance produced. But to the Springfield Armory and Rock Island Arsenal production capabilities, what did it represent to their capacities. How much of their budget went to producing the standard service rifle for the entire US military. Was this an attempt of taking a small issue and saying "hey the war's over, how to we justify everyone's job?"

Again, I don't have this data.

These numbers would give more clues to what happened behind the scenes. Everything comes back to money. Follow the money and find the source of the argument.

Now this could be a "red herring" but there isn't any information to come to a conclusion either way.

[firstflabn]

A sure sign this discussion is in big trouble is when I have to save it with my metallurgical expertise. But, since in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king, I'll do like OJ and take a stab at it.

First, Hatcher was no metallurgist. Even in the context of the science of his day, he was a beginner. I think he says he took ONE course in metallurgy. He says a couple of really stupid things in his Notebook, but that discussion can wait for another day.

A couple of comments:

1. According to a chart prepared by the Tempil stick folks (if you don't know what a Tempil stick is, stop reading and go find out, you won't benefit by going further now), there is only about a 100 deg F difference between the top of the safe forging temp range and the bottom of the burnt temp range. Therefore, it is ludicrous to believe SA didn't have pyrometers in their forge shop, Hatcher or no. Further, the FY18 report in Brophy's SA book says they installed improved pyrometers in the hardening shop. Why would they have the good stuff - and upgrade it - to use on a much less critical operation at a 1000 F lower temp and none at all in the forging shop?

If the pre-1918 forge temp range is the same as the 1942 spec presented in Brophy (p. 549) - 2300-2340 F - then SA is into the 100 deg F no mans land between safely forging and burning.

2. The plot thickens - as carbon content rises, the burnt temp drops. Brophy shows a carbon range of .30 to .38 for receivers. Moving from .30 to .38 LOWERS the burnt temp by about 30 deg F. Interestingly, the FY18 report celebrates their brand new chemical lab which allows them to (apparently for the first time) do a chemical analysis "for all the steel entering into components or tools." This smells like they previously had only checked the paperwork from the outside supplier providing the receiver blanks. 30 deg may matter if you're bumping up against the safe max temp already.

3. According to the Tempil chart, the forging range is a bit over 600 F wide. Thus, SA wrote specs to operate at the tippy top of the safe range. They might have been worried about forging laps, etc., but that kind of defect would probably have been revealed in proof firing - so, they were concerned about budget (in peacetime) and production (in wartime), not burnt steel.

4. Interpreting the Tempil chart on my ancient monitor, there is no discernable difference in color between the top of the safe range and the bottom of the burnt range (100 F, remember). I'd have to ask someone with foundry experience, but Hatcher's story sounds suspect to me - he may not have known enough to call BS on the "cloudy days" cover story.

3. Another reference I have warns that care must be taken when working forgings that have been heated to near the max safe forging temp as getting in too big a hurry (whomping with the whomper) will raise the forging's temp from friction. My bet is that when that happens, the chewy chocolate center is hotter than the outside, so even modern pyrometers would not help.

I suspect this knowledge existed in heavy industries doing really big pieces - locomotive, ship building, hydropower, etc., but that the combination of stodgy old ordnance officers and budget parsimony created an avoidable (but inevitable) f*ck up.

What I wish I could find out is whether the acid etch test (to identify burnt steel) was available in those other industries before WWI. I have no experience with it, but from my materials lab knowledge it doesn't look too tough to perform and interpret. It's a destructive test, but I wonder if the edge of the tang or one side of the recoil lug could be tested and still have a functioning receiver (with possibility of leaving no more than a blemish). I'm no longer in the testing business, so I don't know who to call for a freebie. If it could be done and only leave a minor boo boo, somebody could have a booming business. The test is 100% reliable, though the interpretaion is visual, so might need a practiced eye.

I'm tired of hearing myself type, so I'm out.

[Southron]

Well, regarding the "politics" in 1917....President Wilson had won re-election in 1916 with the slogan: "He Kept Us Out Of the European War."

Beginning in 1914 (shortly after the outbreak of World War I) the J.P. Morgan Bank had signed an agreement with the British government that the Morgan Bank would perform ALL THE PURCHASING IN THE UNITED STATES for the British war effort. Of course, the Morgan Bank was loaning the British government millions and millions of dollars to pay for the purchases they were making. Now these "war supplies" were far more than just guns and ammunition but also included food to feed the British Armies and to a certain extent the British civilian population, horses and mules, cloth and clothing for British Army uniforms and tents,trucks, cars, medical supplies-literally anything and everything the British government required to sustain their war effort.

The money required for this massive purchasing of supplies was far beyond the means of the Morgan Bank. Hence the Morgan Bank had to resort to borrowing money from other American Banks all over the United States. This borrowing literally drained the reserves of most American Banks.

By the Spring of 1917, the "money supply" of the Morgan Bank was drained and so too the money supply of most American Banks that had loaned the Morgan Bank money to support the British. In February of 1917 the Imperial German Government sent the "Zimmerman Telegram" to the government of Mexico. The telegram promised that IF Mexico declared war on the U.S., the German government would supply funds to the Mexican government and form an alliance with Mexico. The idea behind the German Alliance was that Mexico could re-conquer the states of Texas, New Mexico, Nevada, and California.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimmermann_Telegram

The telegram was intercepted by British Intelligence and made public in the United States, this enraged the American population. Another factor was in the Spring of 1917 German submarines started sinking American ships, FLYING THE AMERICAN FLAG carrying supplies to Britain.The end result was that the United States declared war on Germany in April of 1917.

So, the Morgan Bank "Lucked Out" and avoided bankruptcy. For with the declaration of war on Germany, the United States became an ally of the British and the U.S. Treasury made good the loans that the Morgan Bank had made to the British. Uncle Sugar also took over supplying our British ally with the material the British needed to continue the war on their part.

So, my point is with the U.S. entry into World War I, the huge battles taking place in Europe the "Low Number Scandal" probably didn't get much (if any) newsprint with all the other world shaking events taking place then.

[Art]

For those of you who wonder why the Marines kept their low number '03s in service I suggest Maj. Culver's monograph on the subject which is s "sticky" on this forum.

[louis]

I 've read it (Maj. Culver) long ago, just that I also know about all the scandals political, industrial and the stock exchange that took place during and before this time period some where extreme (ie American aircraft, parts and delivery were almost none existent but they took in plenty of money), have you read Smedly Butlers "War is a Racket"? Or his talks about the use of the Marine Corps for big corporations in foreign lands, so all of what everyone is saying adds up to more scandals? But I'm also very cautious.

[Dan Shapiro]

Wasn't Smedly Butlers "War is a Racket" written after he was passed over for Commandant?

[Art]

Wasn't Smedly Butlers "War is a Racket" written after he was passed over for Commandant?

Yep, but that probably had little to do with him writing the book. The Marine Corps has produced more than its share of characters and none more eccentric than Butler. He came from a very politically connected family; his father had been a judge and congressman. He lied about his age to get into the Corps basically giving up a soft life. He was also hopelessly insubordinate and its amazing he was ever even a candidate for commandant. This is a man who won two MoH (three if you count the Marine Corps Brevet Medal he got during the period Officers weren't eligible for the MoH) and tried to give the first one back because he felt he didn't deserve it (he was ordered to accept and wear the medal.) By WW I he had ticked so many people off he was put in charge of docks in France and denied a combat assignment. In 1924 the Corps actually sort of loaned him to the City of Philadelphia to be their Police Commissioner and was forced out after two years for enforcing the law too equitably (rich people didn't like their parties raided for liquor violations and cracking down on cop corruption really didn't prove that popular either) which proves you can be too honest for your own good. In light of the history of the man I think he would have written "War is a Racket" even if he had been selected for Commandant.

Evans Carlson was another one, intellectually gifted and almost fanatically brave this son of a Congregationalist preacher rose from the rank of private to Brigadier General. he won three Navy Crosses founded the Marine Raiders and led the raid on Makin Atoll. He is sometimes considered the father of modern special forces. But..... his ChiCom sympathies ran so deep that the joke in the Corps was that Carlson may have been Red but he wasn't yellow. He actually organized his Raider unit using principles he learned while assigned as an observer of Mao's 8th Route Army, and no that didn't endear him to the Corps but he had become a personal friend of the Roosevelts. Speaking of the Roosevelts, he used his personal connections with them to change the TO&E and structure of his unit essentially on his own authority. It's probably a good thing for him that he died shortly after the war, the post war government wouldn't have appreciated him a bit.

[louis]

I totally agree with you Art, Smedly Butler also tried to have Mussolini arrested because his limo or entourage ran over and killed someone when he was acting police chief. And the expression "Gung Ho" Came from Carlson's experience with the reds. But I guess we are going in a totally different direction here from the original posting. You should read "Black Bagdad" by John Craige a former USMC officer stationed in Haiti during early 1900's and he returned as a political advisor after WW1 and then wrote "Cannibal Cousins". Both are very insightful of this time period both books are very difficult to find. But interesting reading.

[John Sukey]

Study the reason Crozier didn't allow our Army to be equipped with the Lewis gun and get back to me.

The reason; Crozier HATED Lewis because he had written an unflattering but true report about him.
Crozier came up with the CRAP that the Lewis gun had to be "tested" regardless of the fact that it had been use since 1914 and even by the U.S. army in the punitive expedition against Pancho Villa

[John Sukey]

By the way, if my reading on the subject is correct, there were only TWO failures of low number Springfields and we fought WW1 with low number rifles

[Fred]

Oh, there were a Lot more than just TWO low number receiver failures John. Just for starters, please read Hatchers Notebook.

[Col. Colt]

John, both major US Armories STOPPED ALL M1903 RIFLE PRODUCTION DURING A HOT, SHOOTING WORLD WAR over this defect, instituted an investigation and changed their manufacturing practices and measurement equipment over a period of several months. Read Hatcher and the details become a lot more clear.

And there were more than a couple of dozen failures - with even a fatality, lost eye, etc, or two, as I recall. I think they really, really believed they had a problem of unknown magnitude...... Luckily, it ended up being not a terribly high failure rate, but it WAS a definite failure to each of the men holding those few that did fail.

I would like to believe that most of the LN rifles that were going to fail have already done so, and thus the existing pool of rifles is fairly safe. That doesn't mean Murphy can't still nail one of us, all the way back from 1917! If I had a LN, I would be seeking out one of the .22 conversion units for it - or shoot it only with a similar vintage Hollofield Dotter! CC

[PhillipM]

Col Colt, they continue to fail. On a Facebook 1903 group a poster took pictures of a 500k rifle with a left side receiver ring CRACK at a Cabella's gun room. Management said it was okay. Rick the Librarian saw the post, I can't find the pic or I'd put it up.

[Johnny P]

Several years back on one of the forums there was a picture of a low number receiver that had been drilled and tapped. The receiver cracked through the screw holes when fired.

[slamfire]

Wouldn't there be a good cause to politically blow up this issue before the public in the WWI post war years? Typically during peacetime, especially following a war the military sees a significant reduction in funding for their budget due to the need the threat of war has been removed.

If you want to maintain your war production capabilities and justify funding in the post war peacetime era, how do you justify it to the Congressmen and Senators? You create a problem, crisis that needs immediate attention....

You need to completely revamp the whole production process which is going to require tooling, personnel, training and most importantly a non-stripped budget. So that way you don't lose your factory and workers.

I love this question. Just when does the public become aware of the problems with the low number receivers? I have gone through every Arms and the Man, from 1906 till the publication became the American Rifleman, and I have gone through every American Rifleman prior to WW2, and I don’t find a explicit warning about low number receivers. We know that as a population, they were so variable and inconsistent in strength and properties, that a 1927 Army review board recommended scrapping all of them. But who has the review board report and when was it put into the public domain? What I find in the public domain, prior to WW2, are offers by the Army to exchange low number receivers for new improved receivers. The explanation given was that the old heat treatment was not as good as what was done on later receivers. The offers are sort of like the new and improved soap ads you see. Nothing really wrong with the old soap, but this new soap is so much better, you have got to have it. There is nothing in the public domain about burnt, defective, dangerous receivers blowing up in your face, removing half of your face, all of your eyeballs, and a part of your hand. Maybe the Army preferred not to mention that they had spent about $1. Billion dollars making 1.0 Million defective and dangerous rifles.

This is an ad from 1919 . Pre War, that is WW1 rifles, are just the pink. Better get one while you can:

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v479/SlamFire/M1903/1919ManatArmsPreWarM1903BW_zps76aac00f.jpg (http://smg.photobucket.com/user/SlamFire/media/M1903/1919ManatArmsPreWarM1903BW_zps76aac00f.jpg.html)

After reading this, I want to run out and watch that FIFA Movie: United Passions and cheer for the incorruptible FIFA Management. The movie tells us, they are not in it for the money, they are in it because of their passion for football. :banana100::banana100::banana100::banana100::banan a100::banana100::banana100::banana100::banana100:

I have read Crossman, Sharpe, and others, and it is clear to me, all they know is heat treatment. They carp about heat treatment this and heat treatment that, but they are totally clueless as to the real problem in the Arsenals: lack of temperature instrumentation. Every time a metal part is exposed to heat, there is no temperature gage. This is medieval process controls: people eyeballing temperatures. The single heat treatment as practiced by Springfield Armory was just a heat and a quench, which is actually a very poor heat treatment. Even period books, my first edition Machinery’s Handbook shows they should have done a heat, quench, and temper, but even then, the single heat treatment should not have produced receivers were dangerous to use. The material properties were not great, but they should not have been dangerous. I suspect the knowledge that 1 million rifles were assembled without temperature gauges and therefore a large population of them ended up burnt, was not only kept out of the public domain, but kept within the Ordnance Department. I really doubt the guys at the top knew about the problems they had within the Arsenal System, and no one wanted to know. The Army has an unjust culture and a history of shooting the messenger.

Not only is no one in the Army Ordnance Corp acknowledging that they had made 1 million structurally deficient rifles, when a single heat treat 03 blew, the Army claimed the blowups were due to the user practice of greasing bullets. This is and was a lie, greased bullets do not “dangerously” raise pressures, unless of course, you are shooting a structurally deficient rifle. The Army published an editorial in the Arms in the Man, in 1918, claiming that 03 rifles blew up at no higher rate than any other rifle and that when one blew it was all due to shooter misconduct.

What occurred in 1927 to cause an Army Board to look at this issue, I don’t know. But lets say you are Springfield Armory, the new advanced rifle is a decade or more in the future, and your teeny tiny post WW1 workforce really has nothing to do, and it likely to be sent home, maybe that is where the problem surfaced. Until you study the attitudes of the late 20’s you don’t realize just how little people wanted war, how much the military was suspect, and how little support there was on Capitol Hill for more military spending.

I once looked at the number of men in the US Army just after WW1, the drawdown was severe. There were approximately 3.7 men in the Army in 1918. By 1919, there were 19,000 Officers and 205,000 enlisted. By 1921 there were 12,000 Officers and 175,000 enlisted. Someone else can search but I believe by 1927, there were even less Officers and Enlisted as Congress was not interested in funding the military. There were a lot more rifles in storage than there were men who needed rifles.

I am of the opinion that the single heat treat issue was finally raised in the late 20’s, and by Springfield Armory. I have no proof, but by the late 20’s I do not see a military need for more 03’s. There were 2.5 million M1917’s in storage, future production of a semi automatic replacement was years, if not decades off, and considering the ideas of “endless prosperity” and the “war to end all wars” attitudes of the times, I believe Springfield Armory was under the threat of a real shut down. An order for 1,000,000 new 03’s would have been just the ticket. As it was, we know an independent board was established, and it makes sense, because if this was started by SA, any investigation would have had to have been taken out of their hands, given that they would have had a financial incentive in the matter. So this is my pie in the sky conspiracy. Springfield Armory was perfectly placed, as they had all the data, to make a case that all low number rifles should be scrapped, and replaced with new rifles.

Instead, it did not happen that way. Instead of a nice big order for one million rifles, Springfield Armory gets to make replacements when defective rifles blow, or are returned, worn out, to depot. Wonderful product recall, just keep the defective product in service until it hurts someone, or is worn out. It is the low cost alternative, and in my opinion, immoral. Those who support it, are also immoral. Those who support the immoral decision makers who made the decision, are either immoral, or out of touch with reality. Maybe both. And we did not find out about any of this until Hatcher’s Notebook came out in 1948.

So, again, just when does the public become aware of the real problems with the low number receivers? I contend, in 1948, and not before then.

[Fred]

Great Post!

[slamfire]

Great Post!


Thanks! I am however putting on my rain coat as I am about to get pissed on by the multitude of romantics who worship the Ordnance Department, Springfield Armory, and its products. These guys have an Shiny City on the Hill image in their head,

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v479/SlamFire/Misc/AnglesStoppingtheGermansatMONs_zps55e4f731.jpg (http://smg.photobucket.com/user/SlamFire/media/Misc/AnglesStoppingtheGermansatMONs_zps55e4f731.jpg.htm l)

and anyone slinging mud at their Utopia is going to get it!

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v479/SlamFire/Misc/AtomicCannonmushroomcloud_zpsf5505014.jpg (http://smg.photobucket.com/user/SlamFire/media/Misc/AtomicCannonmushroomcloud_zpsf5505014.jpg.html)

[M1CHAZZ]

My question always was, if they were so dangerous, why did they rebarrel them during WWII ?

[slamfire]

At the time, who knew how dangerous low number receivers were? I keep on asking that question and am earnest in desiring to know just when did the Army Ordnance Bureau make a full, open, and honest account of the problems with low number receivers? I don't think the Ordnance Department ever did, but portions of the 1927 report must have leaked out, but not enough to convince ideologues, such a Edward Crossman, that there was problem with low number receivers. Just read Crossman's Book of the Springfield. Crossman uses distasteful racial images in arguing that low number receivers are perfectly safe. :eusa_liar: By introducing those images, and given that he was considered an big, big, big, authority figure:icon_e_ugeek: at the time, anyone who had a blown low number receiver would have been considered by the shooting community as one of those distasteful racial stereotypes. Certainly not a lot of introspection here. The basic failure is the Army's: The Army's unjust culture and the Army's institutional failure to address problems within its Ordnance Department.

When reputations are at stake, High Level Officials do their darndest to muffle and misdirect blame. Might was well ask why the Navy kept the Mark 14 torpedo in service for as long as it did? The Bureau Naval Ordnance absolutely refused to admit they had a torpedo problem. Good Americans died because of their defective torpedoes and Bureau Naval Ordnance never once apologized, admitted it lied, instead it muffled and misdirected problems away from itself. The primary reason was the guys who were in charge of the M14 torpedo program, got promoted up, and from their High Level perches put the blame on anyone but themselves. http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/torpedo-scandal-rear-adm-charles-lockwood-the-mark-14-and-the-bureau-of-ordnance/ and https://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Mark_14_torpedo These guys would rather had America lose the war, then admit to their failures.

There is no reason to believe that the Army Ordnance Department with its low number receivers would have acted any different.

[Johnny P]

My question always was, if they were so dangerous, why did they rebarrel them during WWII ?

War itself is dangerous, and at the time Ordnance had no idea whether we would have the weapons to equip our troops or not. A rifle with a brittle receiver was better than no rifle at all.

[firstflabn]

More than a little bit of 'presentism' in ascribing motives without evidence. The world was a different place and risk was looked at differently than today.

On the date the decision to keep the low numbers was made, those in charge had never driven a car with a safety glass windshield, had never worn a seatbelt, had never seen a construction project where the workers wore hardhats, and had never slept in a house with a smoke detector.

My guess is that science hadn't yet developed the acid etch test whereby burnt steel could be positively identified. It's possibly hinted at in a description of the postwar testing of the inventory of barrel blanks, but it's a bit ambiguous.

For someone with a deep interest, SA's FY28 Annual Report listing "Report of an Investigation of the Strength of Receivers for the Cal. .30, M1903 Rifle" could prove useful. With that description, NARA should be able to locate it. All it takes is an email request, a lot of patience, and, dependent on the report's length, a few bucks. Of course, internet speculation (mine included) is free.

[M1CHAZZ]

War itself is dangerous, and at the time Ordnance had no idea whether we would have the weapons to equip our troops or not. A rifle with a brittle receiver was better than no rifle at all.

Yes, but 1942/43 were not exactly good for our country. Rifles blowing up in the boys/allies face does not help building morale or good will.

[Johnny P]

Yes, but 1942/43 were not exactly good for our country. Rifles blowing up in the boys/allies face does not help building morale or good will.

Good will? A soldier used what he was told to use.

[rebound]

Good will? A soldier used what he was told to use.

If I remember correctly the saying was....(when given an order) - Yours is to do or die, Not to reason why.........

[Southron]

Well, I fired a lot of rounds of cheap World War II surplus .30-06 G.I. ammo in a Low Number Rock Island '03 a friend of mine gave me in the 1960's.

Didn't even know anything bout how dangerous Low Number '03 rifles were. But the receiver of mine must have been forged on a day when the sun shone and the smith pulled the receiver out of the furnace before the steel became burnt.

That being said, I would not fire a Low Number '03 nowadays. I am too old and too wise.

[John Beard]

I have one comment with respect to slamfire's discourse. If I interpret his words correctly, he lays the blame for stirring up the low number controversy squarely at the feet of Springfield Armory. This was not the case. While Springfield Armory did indeed have a strong vested interest in the outcome of the debate, Army Ordnance at the highest levels had inserted themselves into the controversy. But one must recognize that many Ordnance officers in Washington had served at Springfield Armory. So they were looking out for their buddies left behind in Massachusetts.

J.B.

[Southron]

A cousin of mine was drafted into the army in World War II and sent to Fort Stewart, Georgia for training.

He told me that they were issued Model of 1917 Enfields (in 1943) and one or two blew up on the range when the G.I.'s were qualifying.

Yet, no one ever hears anything about "defective: M1917 Enfields, or somne of them blowing up. I do wonder why.

[slamfire]

A cousin of mine was drafted into the army in World War II and sent to Fort Stewart, Georgia for training.

He told me that they were issued Model of 1917 Enfields (in 1943) and one or two blew up on the range when the G.I.'s were qualifying.

Yet, no one ever hears anything about "defective: M1917 Enfields, or somne of them blowing up. I do wonder why.

I am of the opinion that the same problems that the Government Arsenals had, so did some of the manufacturer’s of P17’s. That is, forge shop workers paid piece rate with little to no oversight, and/or little to no temperature instrumentation used in production. I read a post from a gentleman who claimed to have met an Eddystone Forge shop worker. They were paid piece rate and by cranking up forge temperatures, the forge shop workers were able to stamp out parts faster. The factory therefore had created a perverse incentive by paying workers piece rate. The phenomena of burnt steel components was well known back then. The topic is in my 1914 first edition Machinery’s Handbook.

I have heard a number of accounts of brittle Eddystone receivers, from P.O Ackley blow up tests, to others. I have talked to gunsmiths who cracked Eddystone receivers removing barrel which indicates to me a metallurgical problem.

Unlike low number Springfields, the M1917 does not have a published failure database. I don’t believe the Army wanted to create one nor would they have wanted to. The Army wanted to withdraw the M1917’s as soon as possible and have the battle memory of the rifle also disappear as quickly as possible. I have read the Arms and the Man of the period and it turns out the M1917 was an excellent battle rifle. Its features totally overcame any initial skepticism about the rifle. There were more 1917's than 03’s even though they were only made from 1917 to 1918. The 03 Springfield was made up to 1939. It is my opinion that as long as the Winchester, Remington factories were viable, the Army did not any attention drawn to the M1917. If an adult had been in charge, a serious look at the 03 rifle might have permanently shut down the 03 production lines. But this would have effected Government budgets and Government Arsenals. It is historical fiction as to what might have happened, but at the end of WW1 there were at least 1,000,000 03’s of suspect quality, the M1917 was the issue rifle for the vast majority of Americans in Europe, the Army was familiar with the rifle, the 03 was an inferior battle rifle to the M1917, and there were a lot more M1917’s around than there was 03’s. Any attempt to quantify the number of defective M1917’s might have raised questions about the number of defective 03’s if anyone outside the Ordnance Department knew there were any. I don't think anyone of importance did. No one has found any contemporary history or analysis on defective M1917’s. What is in history books is the procurement history, from a British design to an American service rifle. M1917 books retell the same procurement history and copy data from issue service manuals. Beyond this, in the public domain there is very little new or value added information about the M1917. The rifles were made at commercial concerns, whatever records were tossed in the trash a long time ago. However, General Hatcher had personnel experience with the failures of low number Springfields, he was there at the very beginning, had all the reports, and he never provided a peep about burnt receivers prior to his retirement. Once he had retired, and the 03 Springfield was out of service, then and only then did he divulge the big picture. And because of that, we definitively know that low number 03’s are risky, that they are made out of inferior plain carbon steels, and that they were produced on production lines that did not have temperature instrumentation whenever heat was applied.

[John Beard]

I am of the opinion that the same problems that the Government Arsenals had, so did some of the manufacturer’s of P17’s. That is, forge shop workers paid piece rate with little to no oversight, and/or little to no temperature instrumentation used in production. I read a post from a gentleman who claimed to have met an Eddystone Forge shop worker. They were paid piece rate and by cranking up forge temperatures, the forge shop workers were able to stamp out parts faster. The factory therefore had created a perverse incentive by paying workers piece rate. The phenomena of burnt steel components was well known back then. The topic is in my 1914 first edition Machinery’s Handbook.

I have heard a number of accounts of brittle Eddystone receivers, from P.O Ackley blow up tests, to others. I have talked to gunsmiths who cracked Eddystone receivers removing barrel which indicates to me a metallurgical problem.

Unlike low number Springfields, the M1917 does not have a published failure database. I don’t believe the Army wanted to create one nor would they have wanted to. The Army wanted to withdraw the M1917’s as soon as possible and have the battle memory of the rifle also disappear as quickly as possible. I have read the Arms and the Man of the period and it turns out the M1917 was an excellent battle rifle. Its features totally overcame any initial skepticism about the rifle. There were more 1917's than 03’s even though they were only made from 1917 to 1918. The 03 Springfield was made up to 1939. It is my opinion that as long as the Winchester, Remington factories were viable, the Army did not any attention drawn to the M1917. If an adult had been in charge, a serious look at the 03 rifle might have permanently shut down the 03 production lines. But this would have effected Government budgets and Government Arsenals. It is historical fiction as to what might have happened, but at the end of WW1 there were at least 1,000,000 03’s of suspect quality, the M1917 was the issue rifle for the vast majority of Americans in Europe, the Army was familiar with the rifle, the 03 was an inferior battle rifle to the M1917, and there were a lot more M1917’s around than there was 03’s. Any attempt to quantify the number of defective M1917’s might have raised questions about the number of defective 03’s if anyone outside the Ordnance Department knew there were any. I don't think anyone of importance did. No one has found any contemporary history or analysis on defective M1917’s. What is in history books is the procurement history, from a British design to an American service rifle. M1917 books retell the same procurement history and copy data from issue service manuals. Beyond this, in the public domain there is very little new or value added information about the M1917. The rifles were made at commercial concerns, whatever records were tossed in the trash a long time ago. However, General Hatcher had personnel experience with the failures of low number Springfields, he was there at the very beginning, had all the reports, and he never provided a peep about burnt receivers prior to his retirement. Once he had retired, and the 03 Springfield was out of service, then and only then did he divulge the big picture. And because of that, we definitively know that low number 03’s are risky, that they are made out of inferior plain carbon steels, and that they were produced on production lines that did not have temperature instrumentation whenever heat was applied.

You overlook perhaps the most important factor in your discourse. The M1917 rifle was indeed an excellent battle rifle and the Army did indeed have more M1917 rifles than M1903 rifles. But you fail to consider the money! When the war ended, money dried up almost immediately. But the Army still needed a service rifle, albeit in modest quantities, and replacement parts to keep those rifles shooting. Had the Army adopted the M1917 rifle after the war, they would have had to move all the machinery from Eddystone to Springfield and re-train the Springfield work force to make M1917 rifle parts. And very simply, there was no money to do that. Period. The Army was forced by budget restrictions to retain the M1903 rifle and the existing parts production facilities at Springfield. And, I might add, the new double heat treating process then in use solved the weakness/brittleness problem.

J.B.

[oldtirediron]

Eddystone M 1917 Enfields were made at Baldwin Locomotive works in Eddystone Pa, Unfortunately Remington (Owned the plant) Probably hired some locomotive workers who overtorqued the barrel into the receiver, If you have ever tried to get the barrel off of one of these monster's you will need a barrel vise on a milling machine and a receiver wrench with a 6 foot bar on it! I once tried one of these and struggled with it until the barrel came loose with a lock crack, thought I broke the receiver!! After that I used the lathe method where you cut the barrel with a cut off tool directly in front of the receiver-- No more enfield barrel jobs for me, I will only install them , no more removal jobs!

[slamfire]

You overlook perhaps the most important factor in your discourse. The M1917 rifle was indeed an excellent battle rifle and the Army did indeed have more M1917 rifles than M1903 rifles. But you fail to consider the money! When the war ended, money dried up almost immediately. But the Army still needed a service rifle, albeit in modest quantities, and replacement parts to keep those rifles shooting. Had the Army adopted the M1917 rifle after the war, they would have had to move all the machinery from Eddystone to Springfield and re-train the Springfield work force to make M1917 rifle parts. And very simply, there was no money to do that. Period. The Army was forced by budget restrictions to retain the M1903 rifle and the existing parts production facilities at Springfield. And, I might add, the new double heat treating process then in use solved the weakness/brittleness problem.


John: You live in a Springfield centric world, and I believe, so did the pre 1968 Ordnance Department. From my books, (The US Enfield by Ian Skennerton) Eddystone Arsenal was totally, 100%, owned by the US Government.

From page 68


Some moves were made towards payment of royalties to Newton and Carnegie by the United Statdes for the use of patents incorporated in the Model 1917 rifle, but the US Government refused on the grounds that they bought the plant, manufacturing rights and therefore the patents, “lock, stock and barrel”.

It does not make sense to move Eddystone equipment to Springfield unless Springfield Armory is the center of the universe. But, outside the Ordnance Department, Springfield Armory is not the center of the universe, and the adoption of the M1917 would have been a real risk for the shutdown of Springfield Armory. Someone might have asked, why is Springfield Armory around when we have this modern factory with a huge industrial capacity in Eddystone PA, building the most modern battle rifle of the era?. Therefore the question of rifle adoption was a life or death issue for Springfield Armory. Luckily for Springfield Armory, they were able to bury the little problem of 1,000,000 defective rifles , and they had low friends in high places. Their buddies obviously closed Eddystone down, and as quickly as possible, to preserve Springfield Armory.

It can be seen, that in the 1960’s, that when the M16 became the standard issue rifle, that Springfield Armory day’s were numbered. The M16 was being produced by Colt, the Army did not have the drawings nor the manufacturing package and had zero intentions to manufacture the thing. The M16 and its variants have always been manufactured by Commercial concerns and so will be the rifles that replace that. The M14 rifle, designed by Springfield Armory, many made at Springfield Armory, when that rifle was shelved in 1964, it was only four years later that Springfield Armory was closed, and it is not a coincidence either.


And, I might add, the new double heat treating process then in use solved the weakness/brittleness problem.

The double heat treatment did not fix the brittleness problem, because the brittleness problem was due to lack of temperature control in the forge rooms. Something was done after, better process control and better instrumentation, but those double heat treat receivers are made out of low grade materials with unpredictable, call it erratic, hardening depths. They can be quite brittle on their own even when properly forged and heat treated.

This receiver was used for a 35 Whelen rifle. The owner had case separation problems, primarily because the guy does not use case gauges in setting up his sizing dies. It is obvious to me that he set the shoulders to far back. Anyway to remove a separated case, he poured Cerrosafe in the chamber and let it harden. Then he stuck a rod down the barrel, touching the Cerrosafe, and placed a brass drift against the recoil lug and hit it. The recoil lug sheared. It is my opinion the metal is too brittle. The receiver number is 823,6XX.


http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v479/SlamFire/M1903/Rearlugfragmentoff.jpg (http://smg.photobucket.com/user/SlamFire/media/M1903/Rearlugfragmentoff.jpg.html)

[5MadFarmers]

It does not make sense to move Eddystone equipment to Springfield

You mean outside of the fact that it was in fact moved to Springfield Armory right? Stored there. The equipment from the machine gun plants was stored at RIA.


The double heat treatment did not fix the brittleness problem, because the brittleness problem was due to lack of temperature control in the forge rooms.

Which would be all fine and good but heat treatment was never the real problem. Do not use Hatcher as your source unless you're able to get past his lies of omission. Which people have seemingly been unable to do since it was printed. I did. Wasn't difficult. Go to the official sources and it's starkly clear what was the problem and why.


When the war ended, money dried up almost immediately. But the Army still needed a service rifle, albeit in modest quantities, and replacement parts to keep those rifles shooting. Had the Army adopted the M1917 rifle after the war

Which would be a good view if the decision wasn't already made while the war was still on to return to the Springfield after it ended.

Cheers.

[John Beard]

John: You live in a Springfield centric world, and I believe, so did the pre 1968 Ordnance Department. From my books, (The US Enfield by Ian Skennerton) Eddystone Arsenal was totally, 100%, owned by the US Government.

Eddystone was never an arsenal. Eddystone was a city in Pennsylvania that was the site of the Baldwin Locomotive Works. The Baldwin Locomotive Works were cleared out and re-tooled into a rifle factory, which later became the Midvale Steel and Ordnance Co.

Your credibility goes downhill from there. You should quit before suffering further loss.

J.B.

[5MadFarmers]

Going to hijack the thread I am.

The government owned the rifle making machinery at most of the "expansion" plants. This includes the equipment used to make '17s, Nagants, etc., Don't think the equipment was special as it really wasn't. A nice Pratt & Whitney catalog from that time shows the equipment. Rifling machines, lathes, etc., So "tools and jigs." The tools weren't anything specific - outside of designed to make rifles. The jigs were model specific of course. That equipment, and it was about 10 times what SA had, was all pretty much new. More importantly it was designed to deal with machining nickel steel. Which SA needed something terribly as they didn't have the modern tools for that.

"Dear Army,
The war has ended. We note that you own all of this machinery sitting here in our building. Please either remove it, as per contract, or start paying rent.

Sincerely,
Midvale Steel."

What else would the Ordnance Department do with it? Sell it? To whom? It was moved to the Armory and Arsenals and stored. "Reserve." No doubt they did sell some but they retained a lot of it. Which brings me to that thread jack. As mentioned it was about 10X what SA and RIA had. Combined. A lot of rifling machines. Just your generic run of the mill new P&W rifling machinery. Probably still stored when WW2 started. Ever notice that it took about 3 years, yes three years, to get barrel making into shape during WW1? No such lead time was seen during WW2. In spite of them needing machine gun barrels wholesale.

In a real sense those "foreign" contracts for rifles, made during War 1, went a long way in winning War 2.

Just food for thought.

====

If you want to shoot your LN '03s, at least be informed. Heat treatment wasn't really the problem.

[John Beard]

Which would be a good view if the decision wasn't already made while the war was still on to return to the Springfield after it ended.

Any such decision made during the continuation of hostilities during WWI would have been extremely tentative at best.

J.B.

[John Beard]

Going to hijack the thread I am.


Hijack the thread?

Are you challenging Slamfire in a race to the bottom?

If you're going to hijack the thread, please do us all a favor and get your facts straight first.

Thanks!

J.B.

[5MadFarmers]

Any such decision made during the continuation of hostilities during WWI would have been extremely tentative at best.

J.B.

Government is quite predictable. The methods of these types of things have repeated themselves for better than 200 years. 1918-1919 budget. Appropriations. "How much does the Army want and for what?" So the various branches work out a list. That's culled and massaged. Then it's presented to sub-committees. There it's poked apart. Then, after that, it's voted on. Then that goes to the other house. Where it's voted on. They worked out the budget for 1918-1919 in the fall of 1918. They appropriated the money for Springfield to make the rifles. "Why do you need rifles? Aren't we going to have a lot of them?" An expected question. They were ready.

I know, with a war on one would think that maybe doing the 1918-1919 budget is premature. Except it doesn't work that way. They did in fact do that budget. They did in fact question post-war rifle production. The Ordnance Department was clear that they were going to keep producing '03s after the war. "But what about the war?" The war was, and isn't, funded via that budget. "Emergency appropriations" are an entirely different thing.

So, no, it wasn't tentative. They knew in the fall of 1918 that when the war ended they were going to keep SA making rifles. 1903s. They explained why. In detail. The best source for what happened, and why, is those hearings. Taken under oath. The entire M-1917 story is contained in hearings. The Nagants are covered. A lot is covered in much detail. What they did with the equipment. Why.

The story of the problems with the M-1903 are covered in War Department Document 901. At least much of it. "Report of tests of metals and other materials." Watertown Arsenal. They did the "test of metals" back into the 1800s. Always a fascinating read. When one is wondering about problems with metals that'd be the first place it look. Unlike Hatcher's book it's official. It's detailed. It's quite clear on what was going on.

[11mm]

Eddystone was never an arsenal. Eddystone was a city in Pennsylvania that was the site of the Baldwin Locomotive Works. The Baldwin Locomotive Works were cleared out and re-tooled into a rifle factory, which later became the Midvale Steel and Ordnance Co.

Your credibility goes downhill from there. You should quit before suffering further loss.

J.B.


With greatest respect to John Beard, I believe nobody ever "cleared out" the Baldwin Locomotive Works. Even though (by heritage) I am an American Locomotive Company fan, I know that Baldwin was always the No. 1 US producer of steam locomotives and during WW1 produced great quantities at Eddystone for both US (USRA during the war) and foreign governments. They were producing probably 60% of the domestic and maybe foreign steam locomotives at that time, and as American had seven plants competing against the one Eddystone plant, they were doing quite well. The Baldwin plant at Eddystone had basically been completed in 1912, replacing much of their Philadelphia downtown factory. I know the rifle production was located there in Eddystone in newer facilities, but they kept pumping out locomotives at a high rate, also. The rifle plants were, again I believe, built on Baldwin land, but the locomotive production continued in parallel. I believe the rifle works were pretty much secondary at that location. The steel tonnage of one medium sized steam locomotives equals an awful lot of rifles.

[5MadFarmers]

Hijack the thread?

Are you challenging Slamfire in a race to the bottom?

If you're going to hijack the thread, please do us all a favor and get your facts straight first.


Go ahead, pick one. Any one. Read WDD 901 yet? Read the appropriations hearings? Didn't think so.

I've actually been wondering to myself for a few years if I'd do this one in the end. Kind of 50/50 on it. Already gathered the material. A lot of material. Volumes really. So I guess I will. The WW1 contract rifles with coverage of the '03s tossed in for good measure.

Lot's of material was reviewed.




Eddystone was never an arsenal


Outside of that it was anyway. New building. All the equipment was purchased from the Brits. By the U.S. Government. Government equipment in a privately operated factory. No different from Lake City during WW2 really. But what do I know? Why not check the first deficiency appropriation for 1919? Say page 1182? "Eddystone Arsenal." Says who? General Newcomer.

The good Senators and their questions are always an entertaining read.

Not going to bother debating it. I'll just do it as a book. People can have fun with it that way. Sources listed.

Cheers.

[John Beard]

With greatest respect to John Beard, I believe nobody ever "cleared out" the Baldwin Locomotive Works. Even though (by heritage) I am an American Locomotive Company fan, I know that Baldwin was always the No. 1 US producer of steam locomotives and during WW1 produced great quantities at Eddystone for both US (USRA during the war) and foreign governments. They were producing probably 60% of the domestic and maybe foreign steam locomotives at that time, and as American had seven plants competing against the one Eddystone plant, they were doing quite well. The Baldwin plant at Eddystone had basically been completed in 1912, replacing much of their Philadelphia downtown factory. I know the rifle production was located there in Eddystone in newer facilities, but they kept pumping out locomotives at a high rate, also. The rifle plants were, again I believe, built on Baldwin land, but the locomotive production continued in parallel. I believe the rifle works were pretty much secondary at that location. The steel tonnage of one medium sized steam locomotives equals an awful lot of rifles.

I do not disagree in the least. I am not familiar with the intricate details of the transaction. All I know is that the property and facilities were pre-existing, were owned by the Baldwin Locomotive Works, and were leased by the British for the purpose of rifle production. And I certainly do not suggest that Baldwin terminated locomotive production.

Thanks for your clarification!

J.B.

p.s.,

Have you seen the huge steam locomotive in the Henry Ford Museum? I have a 1912-dated photo of a locomotive much like that one surrounded by its crew on my desk at work.

[5MadFarmers]

All I know is that the property and facilities were pre-existing, were owned by the Baldwin Locomotive Works, and were leased by the British for the purpose of rifle production.

In 1915 two facilities were built by Baldwin Locomotive specifically for rifle (1) and munitions (2) production. The buildings were then leased to Midvale Steel and Ordnance and the Eddystone Munitions Company for said activities. Baldwin took a one time charge of $3,462,125 for the facilities. "The plants leased to Midvale Steel and Ordnance Company and the Eddystone Munitions Company were so designed that the buildings could, at the expiration of the leases, be utilized as locomotive shops."

Cheers.

[butlersrangers]

3188831889 (Young woman doing machine operation on front-sight assembly, note "U.S." marking on Machine Bed).


FWIW: (From "The Eddystone Story" by Walter J. Kuleck, Ph.D.)

"The war activities of the Baldwin Locomotive Works also included the construction of two large plants on their property at Eddystone for the manufacture of rifles and ammunition.....

On April 30, 1915, the British Government placed a contract with the Remington Arms Company of Delaware for 1,500,000 rifles to be manufactured in one of the plants mentioned above......

The main building of the Rifle Plant covered 14 acres of ground, and had a length of 1,040 feet and a maximum width of 816 feet. Great difficulty was experienced in obtaining delivery of equipment and machinery in time to meet the terms of the British contract, and some idea of the extent of the installation may be had from the fact that 10,000 machines, 40,200 feet of shafting, and 424,000 feet of belting were required......

Soon after the United States entered the war, April 6, 1917, and in view of its prospective rifle requirements, cancellation of the British contracts, after the completion of 600,000 rifles, was arranged. Later, the British-owned machinery and equipment passed by agreement to the United States Government who continued the British arrangement with the Remington Arms Company for its operation in the manufacture of rifles for the United States Army.....

On January 2, 1918, the Remington Arms Company of Delaware was absorbed by the Midvale Steel and Ordnance Company (Eddystone Rifle Plant). The latter Company operated the plant until after the close of the war.....

Operations at the Plant ceased on January 11, 1919, at which time nearly 300,000 rifles were in process of manufacture. The Government then leased the premises for a storage plant.....

The total number of rifles manufactured in this Plant was 1,959,954, in addition to spare parts equivalent to 200,000 rifles. The greatest production exceeded 6,000 rifles per day, and the maximum number of employees was 15,294......"

(from "History of The Baldwin Locomotive Works 1831-1923", company history reprinted in "The Locomotives that Baldwin Built" by Fred Westing, Bonanza Books, New York, 1966).

[John Beard]

Butlersrangers

Thanks for your posting!

Dr. Kuleck's account is interesting and informative, but not complete nor entirely accurate. Nevertheless, thanks for your contribution!

J.B.

[slamfire]

United States Bulletin: Monday Sept 29, 1919, page 139

https://books.google.com/books?id=hycgAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA1-PA139&dq=eddystone+arsenal&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAGoVChMIxu7Wpq2axwIViBiSCh3y5AEY#v=on epage&q=eddystone%20arsenal&f=false


Brass and Steel for Sale:
2 Oct 1919

48 steel billets, 4 1/2 inches square, semi finished, about 8,126 pounds located at the US Eddystone Storage Arsenal, Eddystone PA, where it may be inspected by applying to the District Ordnance Office, Philadelphia, PA


The United States Bulletin has this bold banner " ESTABLISHED under an order of THE PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES. AUTHORITATIVE RECORD of all U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTITIVIES"

The bold print is in the original format. This document looks to be a combination of the Early Bird and the Commerce Business Daily. As it is, it is an official Government Document and the US Government is calling Eddystone, Eddystone Arsenal, or if you want to nit pick, US Eddystone Storage Arsenal.

If the argument for credibility is whether Eddystone was an Arsenal or not, I am going to claim that my credibility is good. If the argument for credibility is whether I wear black pants belts with black shoes, then my credibility is not so good.

Anyway, sorry for upsetting you John. I still think you have a Springfield Armory centric view.




It does not make sense to move Eddystone equipment to Springfield
You mean outside of the fact that it was in fact moved to Springfield Armory right? Stored there. The equipment from the machine gun plants was stored at RIA.

Very interesting! As an analogy, before the old man's corpse got cold, his ever loving relatives drained his bank account and walked off with his possessions! . I have not found the Budget Discussions you mentioned, would love to read them, but what I read into this is Springfield Armory eliminating the competition. By gutting Eddystone Arsenal as rapidly as possible and taking the tooling and machines, they were ensuring that it was impossible for Eddystone jto make any future rifles, even if someone wanted M1917's instead of 03's.

To me it makes more sense, if you are going to make M1917's, to do it at Eddystone. You had a trained workforce, a local supplier base, and a factory. You want to kill the M1917 program, you destroy the factory.



The double heat treatment did not fix the brittleness problem, because the brittleness problem was due to lack of temperature control in the forge rooms.

Which would be all fine and good but heat treatment was never the real problem. Do not use Hatcher as your source unless you're able to get past his lies of omission. Which people have seemingly been unable to do since it was printed. I did. Wasn't difficult. Go to the official sources and it's starkly clear what was the problem and why.

Thank you very much for the reference!
Report of Tests of Metals and Other Materials made in Ordinance Laboratory at Watertown Arsenal Mass, Fiscal Year 1918, War Department Document 901, 338 pp.

This is a very interesting document and it sure does put things into a more interesting light. Like most people the only reference I had was Hatcher's Notebook and derivative sources, but this sure puts the low number Springfield problems in a much better light.

I am of the opinion that you are right, Hatcher has a number of lies of omissions. After working in a professional, hierarchical organization for decades, it becomes clear what Hatcher is doing in his writings. Hatcher had just retired, but before retiring he had climbed his way to the top of the Ordinance Department, which was something very difficult to do. In all respects Hatcher is an exceptional man, probably an outstanding manager, and he is ambitious. All during his career he made himself a celebrity with his writings in the Army Ordnance Magazine, in the Arms and the Man/American Rifleman. He is a well known individual with brand recognition within the shooting community and within the Army. He also writes and sells a number of books, gaining more name recognition and deriving a good income. This guy must have been a 16 hour a day sort of work a holic. All his activities can be understood in the light of career advancement and financial remuneration. Which I must say, is in of itself, not evil, but sometimes people have to sell their souls to make their goals.

Hatcher retires and in 1947 writes Hatcher's Notebook, a book still in print. He has already embarked on his second career, and that is climbing to the top of the NRA leadership. Incidentally, something which he accomplishes. I have looked at current pensions for Major Generals, and while good, it is chump change compared to a top rank NRA salary. Current top level NRA salaries are around $600,000 to $800,000 a year. And you probably get free parking. One very critical, perhaps the most critical job requirement at the NRA, is good relations with the Army. The Army punted the NRA out of the Pentagon in 1968, so now it is hard to realize the close relationship the NRA had with the Army, but it was more than close. The NRA acted more Green than Green and you can see this particularly in the 1960's magazines. The Army financed the National Matches, which was equal to at least 25% of the total NRA budget, the Freedom Flintlock presented to the Army Chief of Staff, the Marine Corp Commandant, kissy, kissy, huggy, huggy. There are all sorts of stories about shooters the NRA trained shooting their way to victory in Vietnam, etc. NRA writers could call up the Army and receive technical answers and data, and I am quite sure there was more going on between the two than what I see in print.

So, after retiring, Hatcher is writing another book. More income, but he wants to maintain good relationships with the Army. Hatcher is always supportive of the Army, never critical. Hatcher is a master of the misdirection, nothing is ever the Army's fault. He masterfully spins the low number 03 failure into an Army Triumph. The Army overcame those evil, rascally forge shop workers and built the ultimate 03: the double heat treat. In my opinion, the whole low number episode was a complete Army failure. They built 1,000,000 rifles that as a class, were so defective, that they should have been scrapped. This information was held in house till 1927, and even then, a reasonable accounting of the dangers of these things does not come out until 1947. Till then, the Army was issuing defective rifles to troops, as it was cheaper to injure a Soldier, Sailor, Marine, than replace the inventory of defective rifles. I consider it immoral what they did: keep a defective product in the field, till the rifle blew up, or wore out.

I have copied a couple of the Watertown summaries, listed here.

Examination of Receivers from United States Rifles Model of 1903, burst during Navy Target Practice
Conclusions:
One of the receivers was neither case hardened nor heat treated. It was in the perlitic conditon as show by the micrographs. The structure was very coarse.

Examination of United States Rifle, Caliber 30, Model of 1903, which failed at Camp Greene NC

Conclusions.
The receiver of this rifle had not been properly heat treated prior to being put in service. Microscopic examination showed the metal to be very coarsely crystalline and the structure was that obtained by cooling at a fairly rapid rate from a high temperature. The metal was very brittle under impact, as evidenced by its being readily broken when struck a light blow with a hammer.

Broken Bolts from United States Rifle, Caliber 0.30 Model of 1903

Object: The object of this investigation was to make a complete examination of these two bolts and if possible determine the cause of failure.
Conclusions: It is the conclusion of this laboratory that the failure of both of these bolts is due to the same factor. Both were very hard and brittle and their resistance to sudden impact was very low, as could be ascertained by securely fastening the metal in a vise and striking light blows with a hammer. the brinell hardess number on one of these was 430 and on the other it was 489. these structure of both was martensitic. This structure is characteristic of very brittle material

The chemical composition of these bolts is not within the specified limits with regard to carbon, manganese, and silicon

A couple of issues fall out, and they are not as simple as evil forge shop workers. Firstly, the materials they are using are inconsistent. They evidentially don't have an incoming material inspection nor a material certification of incoming materials. I know from historical sources that the materials of the age were widely inconsistent, and the chemical analyses by Watertown shows that. Another issue has to do with heat and temperature. Too much heat, too little heat, no temperature controls. Generally the parts are brittle which is an indication of too much heat, but to have a receiver which was neither case hardened or nor heat treated shows a production line out of control. They are shipping junk, either intentionally, or because they don't know they are making junk.

So the story is far more complicated than "evil forge shop workers" and virtuous Army Officers. Makes a good morality tale though?

Thanks much for the reference. Maybe you can tell me where to find the budget debates on the Eddystone closures?

[kragluver]

WDD 901 was very enlightening. I went back and re-read Hatcher on the topic too. I didn't think Hatcher was leaving anything out. The tabulation of failures at the end of his book is in line with the Watertown Arsenal report. The author of 901 states three contributing factors to the failures: 1) high Sulphur and Phosphorus content in many of the samples; 2) poor quality control of heat treat ; and 3) square barrel threads. They also question SA's continued use of case hardened Carbon steel in the bolt and receiver application when much better steel alloys were then available.

Thanks for all the good discussion here - we can all learn from this topic.

Hatcher notes 68 receiver failures by serial number in his book. The WDD 901 report (for fiscal year 1918 only) documents 14 more where the S/N was destroyed and unknown. In addition, Hatcher mentions pulling "several" receivers at random from the assembly floor at SA and several of those shattered when tested (he doesn't say how many). Anyone who believes shooting a LN 1903 is safe today because of so few reported failures needs to do some more research. The problem was serious and more widespread than many recognize today.

[DRAGONFLYDF]

to throw a wrench in the mess, how about the 03s that were produced from 03 to 1915 ? they were not under wartime build up pressure, they were produced at peacetime paces, and a number were sold to civilians in the form of NRA Sales rifles.

[kragluver]

Right - in fact every s/n that is quoted in the 901 report is from a rifle made prior to 1917.

The issue is two-fold. They had a weak design with a nascent failure mode but it wasn't uncovered until ww1 when poor quality ammo caused a large number of case head failures. Shooting normal, good quality ammo in the rifle doesn't create a problem. Its when the ammo fails or some other overpressure event occurs.

In ww1 you had a large number of rounds being fired so the number of potential incidents increased by orders of magnitude. Couple this with poor quality ammo and the design and manufacturing issues of the rifle are uncovered.

In the airplane industry we say that it takes at least three factors to cause an accident. Take away any one of those factors and the accident doesn't occur. The same is often the case in any industry.

[slamfire]

to throw a wrench in the mess, how about the 03s that were produced from 03 to 1915 ? they were not under wartime build up pressure, they were produced at peacetime paces, and a number were sold to civilians in the form of NRA Sales rifles.

It is my memory that the first low number blowups from Hatcher's Notebook were at a cartridge manufacturer. The first receivers listed as blown up were a 1907 vintage receiver and a 1917 receiver. These receivers blew at National Brass & Copper Tube factory, a factory making ammunition for the US military during WW1. The 1907 receiver fragmented and blew a piece of shrapnel piercing the lung of the operator.

National Brass & Copper Tube had college educated and trained metallurgists, you can see that in the report. They were able to refute any self serving BS coming out of Springfield Armory about their receivers. Some thing that a lowly Infantry Officer could not, and would not. Something that is important to remember that hierarchical organizations are incapable of self reform. The first thing they do is shoot the messenger of bad news and denign there is any problem. Reform can only occur due to outside influences, and here you have it, an organization not under the War Department, outside the chain of command, pointing out that Springfield Receivers were burnt.

It is apparent that quality control, and more important, process control on the factory floor was uncontrolled or unstable. You just have to have gone though old line factories to see piles of in process product, defective product tossed in corners or on the side of a bin. In time no one knows why there is pile there and the defective product gets put back into production. With piles of in-process parts in bins, it takes a long time before they figure out that a certain batch of parts was defective. The inspection criteria assumed a certain number of defectives per lot. Mil Std 105 shows this inspection process. Lets say the Standard allowed 2 defective parts per 100, and the inspector found three, then he was supposed to pull more, and if lets say out of the next 50, only found 1 defective part, the whole lot was shipped, even though they had just found that 4 parts out of 150 parts were bad! There is no reason to assume that there were "good" years because at the time, it was assumed that some bad product was going out the door. Back then, it was a cat and mouse game between production and quality control. Production was monetarily incentivized to ship everything, Quality Control was trying to separate out the good from bad. Also, no one wanted strict Quality Control because then, no product would go out the door!

I recall a quote from a General Motors Executive from the 1970's. A huge number of these cars were defective. The Executive was asked about this, and he said "Marketing sells it, manufacturing makes it, and Customer Service makes it work". That was the attitude then. I toured the GM Arlington plant in the early 1980's and at the end of the line, at the time I was there, seven guys were pushing a car away because it would not start. I have toured a couple of modern automotive factories now, and if you ask, "when was the last time a car did not start", no one knows. If it happened, it happened so long ago, they don't know. Anyway the old GM attitude towards product quality almost bankrupted GM. If a customer spends a year salary on a new car, they don't want to be spending days or weeks at customer service, waiting for the grease monkey's there to fix the thing. They expect a good product the day they drive the car from the lot.

GM was incapable of self reform, and it took the Japanese with their cheap, but quality cars, to force GM to make decent cars. I remember people buying those cheap 1970's Japanese cars and finding out, they suckers ran. They did not fall apart. Then the Japanese moved into the mid scale market and that almost killed GM, Ford, Dodge. In fact, in the 1980's, GM was selling their Nova at a discount. At one time the GM Nova was a rebranded Toyota. Car companies do this all the time, buying cars from a rival and putting their decals on the car. Even though it was a Toyota, they had to sell the Nova at a discount because GM did not stand for quality. The same car, at the Toyota dealership, people were paying above sticker price for the same. car.

[5MadFarmers]

Hatcher retires and in 1947 writes Hatcher's Notebook, a book still in print. He has already embarked on his second career, and that is climbing to the top of the NRA leadership. Incidentally, something which he accomplishes. I have looked at current pensions for Major Generals, and while good, it is chump change compared to a top rank NRA salary.

Snip. No, you're on the wrong track. The answer is contained in the official history of the Ordnance Department in WW2. The green volumes. Read them carefully and do a bit of math and you'll get the answer. I'm being guarded as you seem to enjoy digging so I'm not going to spoon feed you the information. Better for you to enjoy the hunt. Spoon fed information is how this mess has become so ingrained in the first place.


WDD 901 was very enlightening. I went back and re-read Hatcher on the topic too. I didn't think Hatcher was leaving anything out.

Not "left something out" but "put it in using a fashion making something non-obvious that should have been made very obvious." John seems to place his faith in the double heat treat but he's missing the solution for what was the bigger problem. Double heat treatment was only half the answer.

I covered it clearly already elsewhere.

[jgaynor]

I must have a different edition of Hatcher's notebook than some of the members here. I find nothing in the way of "startling revelations" in this thread that Hatcher himself did not publish 60+ years ago.

[John Beard]

sure miss the gold old days

The "Good Ole Days" are still here! It's called the CMP!

J.B.

[CJCulpeper]

If low number rifles were so dangerous as most have alleged, then why didn't the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps scrap and replace their low number rifles as well during overhaul? Surely their rifles were no stronger or more reliable than those in the Army.

If low number rifles were so dangerous as most have alleged, then why did Army Ordnance suspend scrappage of low number receivers a full year before Pearl Harbor and U.S. entry into WWII?
Are we to suppose that time cured the problem and strengthened the receivers?

Food for thought.

J.B.

Could it be that the World War in Europe started in September 1, 1939 and the Paciifc had been at war since July 7. 1937 with the 2nd Japanese-Chinese War? Roosevelt (may he rot in hell) and his fellow interventionists were hedging their bets that they could get us into the shooting matches. They would need all of the rifles laying around for Lend Lease and our own involvement.

[Cosine26]

Hi danco101
I do not mean to nitpick, but I will. The replacement high number receivers for the low numbered receivers through the DCM were not free. I have the DCM price lists for the period and they were exchangeable for $7.90. I ordered two, one in 1964 and one in 1965. The packing handling was $1.52 for a total of $9.42.
The procedure was:
1. A request was submitted to the U.S Army Weapons Command at Rock Island Arsenal. The request required the serial number of the SHT/LN receiver that you wished to exchange.
2. Rock Island replied with approval and requested that the old receiver (stripped) be turned in.
3. Upon receipt of the SHT/LN receiver, a Purchase Order would be prepared and forwarded to the purchaser stating the price and the P&H charges.
4. Purchaser would submit a money order with the purchase order and the receiver would be shipped on an AMSWE form 99.
My original request was submitted on October 24, and I received the replacement receiver on Dec 15.
When the supply of high numbered M1903 receivers was exhausted, A barreled 03A3 receiver would be shipped, until the supply was exhausted at which time the program was terminated circa 1970.
In the pre WWII years, receivers were available to NRA members for purchase including NM receivers and star gauged barrels. If one sent in a rifle having a SHT/LN receiver, the Armory would provide a new receiver for free.
FWIW.

[scosgt]

I know this is an old post, but Stebbins in his book give the opinion that the ones that would blow up already DID blow up. Any exisiting LN receiver has been re-barreled and fired many times. He also shows how to tell if there is a problem on the receiver.
So no, I personally will not shoot a LN gun, but it may well be safe at this point.

[PhillipM]

I know this is an old post, but Stebbins in his book give the opinion that the ones that would blow up already DID blow up. Any exisiting LN receiver has been re-barreled and fired many times. He also shows how to tell if there is a problem on the receiver.
So no, I personally will not shoot a LN gun, but it may well be safe at this point.

I have seen a few reports of LN 03's blowing up in modern times and Chuckindenver has seen more and catalogues them.

Admittedly the ones I saw referenced blew because of a reloading error, but the point still remains, a DHT or NS will stay together while a LN grenades in a serious reloading error.

I don't know of a LN 03 that has blown in the modern era with quality ammunition.

A couple I have seen referenced on the net blew because the owner thought they'd be extra safe and use a reduced load with pistol powder and accidentally double charged.

I think shooting a LN 03 with good ammo is safe.

I think my late number 03's shoot the same as my low number 03, so I don't see the point in firing 36018.