View Full Version : The Aircraft Carrier War
There has only been one aircraft carrier war, World War II in the Pacific where two roughly equal Carrier fleets fought each other in six major battles between the Spring of 1942 and the Fall of 1944. This will take the form of a series of posts on the ships, the aircraft and the men. and the battles. It's going to be in thumbnails of course.
One thing is important to the outcome. The Japanese didn't just have to win every battle, they had to win every battle decisively. No close, wins, not even too many not close wins and they knew it. The Americans had to be forced to terms within a year, preferably six months and to do that the Japanese would have to administer some hellacious wins.
The Ships, Japanese
The ships here all saw action in 1942. More would be added later in time for the 1944 battles and others would be completed after the Japanese Naval Air Arm had ceased to exist and bobbed around in the Sea of Japan under regular attack or were expended as fast transports.
The British invented the Aircraft Carrier, they also invented virtually every major innovation including the arrestor gear, angled deck, mirrored landing system, ski jump assist for loaded VSTOL aircraft and on and on. But...to them for a long time the carrier was a scout. It only later became a true weapons platform.
The Japanese, denied new capital ship tonnage, by naval treaties cast about for a way to catch up. They had built an experimental carrier in 1922, the Hosho of 7420 tons, with a capacity of 11 aircraft and a speed of 25 knots so they had a bit of a handle on what they might need. The Tactical unit was to be the fast carrier task force (Kido Butai) which would be armed with bombers and fighters projecting them over long distances at high speed to engage targets on land and sea.
Thanks to the treaties all major nations had hulls from battleships and battlecruisers on had scheduled to be scrapped. These hulls had the advantage of being large, sometimes very large, but their capital ship origins sometimes limited their aircraft capacity depending on the state of completion when converted
Oh, to be truly effective as a fleet unit a speed of at least 26 knots was needed, some of these converted ships, and the Japanese converted a lot, were marginal on speed.
These are the ships that fought in the 1942 battles in order of appearance excepting Hosho of course. Only heavy CV and light CVL ships are included, no escorts, CVE. Post 1942 ships will be added in a later post.
CV Akagi, converted battlecruiser 1927
41,300 tons
31 knots
91 aircraft
CV Kaga, converted battleship 1928
28 knots
45,541 tons
90 Aircraft
CVL Ryujo 1929
29 knots
12,732 tons
38 Aircraft
CV Soryu Class 1937-39
Hiryu
34 knots
18,880 tons
71-73 Aircraft
CVL Hosho Class 28 knots, converted sea plane tenders
Zuiho
30 aircraft
11262 tons
CV Shokaku Class, 34 knots 1941
Zuikaku
29,000 tons
34 knots
84 aircraft
CVL Ryuho 1942 Coverted sub tender
13,360 tons
26 knots
31 aircraft
CV Hiyo class, 1942 converted ocean liners
Jun'yo
26,949 tons
26 knots
53 aircraft
8 CV, 5 CVL
The American Ships available in 1942
They usually were more efficient ships (with exceptions) carrying more aircraft on smaller displacements. The US used no CVL in the early war years.
CV Lexington Class 1920-27 converted battlecruisers
Saratoga
37,000 tons
34 knots
90 aircraft
CV Ranger 1930 (spent much of the war in the Atlantic)
14578 tons
29 knots
86 aircraft
CV Yorktown Class 1937-40
Enterprise
Hornet
20,000 tons
32 knots
90 aircraft
CV Wasp 1940
15,000 tons
29 knots
90 Aircraft
7 CV total
The American deficiency in numbers of carriers would be an issue all through 1942
The Brits invented all that? I'm not sure how I feel about the ski jump ramp takeoff.
The only carrier war is for sure. I kind of wonder about any battle ships now a days.
Do we even call them Battleships anymore? They had a big word for them back then. Started with a D.
The Brits invented all that?
They also invented the steam catapult.
jon_norstog
02-15-2022, 10:54
There has only been one aircraft carrier war, World War II in the Pacific where two roughly equal Carrier fleets fought each other in six major battles between the Spring of 1942 and the Fall of 1944. This will take the form of a series of posts on the ships, the aircraft and the men. It's going to be in thumbnails of course.
One thing is important to the outcome. The Japanese didn't just have to win every battle, they had to win every battle decisively. No close, wins, not even not close wins and they knew it. The Americans had to be forced to terms within a year, preferably six months and to do that the Japanese would have to administer some hellacious wins.
Supposedly Yamamoto told the government that he could attack the US, but if he did they had six months to win the war. If they didn't do that they would lose. I once found a "Navy League" magazine from 1940 with an editorial spread urging the Navy to build as many BBs as as possible, soon as possible, and not a word about carriers. They were lobbying Congress pretty hard. Fortunately they didn't get their way.
jn
The Aircraft - Japanese
The Nakajima B5N Kate Carrier Attack Plane
Crew: 3 - Pilot, Navigator-Aircraft Commander-Bombardier, Radio Operator -Gunner
Speed: 235 MPH
Range: 600 miles
Armament: One or two 7.7 mm Machine Guns firing forward. 1- 7.7 mm Lewis Gun rear. 1 Type 91 Torpedo, or 1 - 1760 pound A.P. bomb, or 2 - 250 pound bombs, or 6 - 132 pound bombs.
The best aircraft of its type in the first half of 1942, and at least adequate through 1943; though the Japanese were already working on its replacement. Like most Japanese aircraft it did suffer from flamibility. It can not be mentioned without talking about the Type 91 Torpedo it carried and was modified throughout the war; stable, reliable, with a shallow drop depth and capable of being dropped at the top speed of the aircraft from over 300 feet, like the "Long Lance" it was in a class by itself. All other torpedo bombers were tied to some variation of the 100 - 100- 1,000 rule mandating a drop at 100 mph, at 100 feet at 1,000 yards.
The Aichi D3Y "Val"
Crew: 2 - Pilot, Radio Operator/Gunner
Speed: 270 MPH
Range: 840 miles
Armament: 2 7.7 mm firing forward, 1 7.7 Lewis Gun rear. Bombs 1- 550 lb bomb and 2 - 132 pound bombs (optional)
Because of its ruggedness and maneuverabilty the Val was sometimes used in the Combat Air Patrol (CAP.) In 1942 the Japanese were looking to replace it because of its relatively light bomb load. Like its counterpart the American SBD Dauntless it would sink more enemy ships, alone or with others, than any other navy aircraft type.
The A6M2 (Type 0 Model 21) Zero Zeke
Speed: 330 mph (345 mph W.E.P.)
Rate of climb: 3,100 ft/min
Range: 900 miles
Armament: 2 7-7 mm machine guns, 2 - 20 mm cannon.
The best carrier fighter of 1942 by a wide margin and capable of competing with any land based opponent, it's extreme range made it the first true long range escort fighter. This extreme range also gave it a very long "loiter" time in the CAP. It was not without flaws, very fragile it had a never exceed speed of only 370 mph. A note on War Emergency Power (W.E.P.) Fighters in WWII had the capability of temporarily increasing top speed by over revving the engine or injecting something, usually an alcohol mixture into the fuel. This could only be done for short periods and was closely monitored as it was damaging to the engine and required increased maintenance. Japanese fighter aircraft top speed was always shown by them as maximum combat power even though W.E.P. was available on all of them.
In addition both sides used numbers of obsolescent or sometimes downright obsolete in combat in 1942. One example is the A5M Claude fixed under carriage carrier fighter which was being fielded in limited numbers on carriers and and larger numbers on land bases well into 1942.
Japanese naval aircraft had a range advantage with their aircraft which gave him a first punch advantage should they find you first for the entire war.
Supposedly Yamamoto told the government that he could attack the US, but if he did they had six months to win the war. If they didn't do that they would lose. I once found a "Navy League" magazine from 1940 with an editorial spread urging the Navy to build as many BBs as as possible, soon as possible, and not a word about carriers. They were lobbying Congress pretty hard. Fortunately they didn't get their way.
jn
He almost surely said words to that effect. But once war was on he was all in.
It is what it was. The US was not prepared for war. The Japs had already been at war in China which provided them an excellent opportunity to develop equipment/tactics, etc. Their pilot development was inadequate to replace losses. Their various types of airplanes were not so hot once the US began to develop up to date planes. Lack of self-sealing gas tanks and armor forced the Japs to pay a high price in unsustainable losses. There really was no excuse for the poor quality torpedos first used by the US. Got to wonder why development was not informed by examination of Jap and German torpedos. There is more but this is a start. Sincerely. bruce.
It is what it was. Got to wonder why development was not informed by examination of Jap and German torpedos. There is more but this is a start. Sincerely. bruce.
Japanese torpedoes were a closely guarded state secret. We actually knew a torpedo could be oxygen fueled but the fear of the hazards involved kept us from making one. Our "surprise" at the torpedoes was fueled by, among many other things, racism, as well as the Japanese wisely understating the performance of almost every thing they could. We were so in denial about it we discounted their capabilities for almost a year after encountering them. It might have helped if we had actually tested our torpedoes but made an executive decision that they were too expensive to expend in tests :icon_e_surprised: !!! Then to add insult to injury the Navy Bureau of Ordnance refused to even consider defects for almost a year blaming all problems on "operator error" and prohibiting troubleshooting.
I had a friend who once told me a Long Lance ship launched (our name for it when we figured it out) compared to ours destroyer torpedoes at the start of the war like a JDAM to a firecracker.
Japanese torpedoes were a closely guarded state secret. We actually knew a torpedo could be oxygen fueled but the fear of the hazards involved kept us from making one. Our "surprise" at the torpedoes was fueled by, among many other things, racism, as well as the Japanese wisely understating the performance of almost every thing they could. It might have helped if we had actually tested our torpedoes but made an executive decision that they were too expensive to expend in tests :icon_e_surprised: !!! Then to add insult to injury the Navy Bureau of Ordnance refused to even consider defects for almost a year blaming all problems on "operator error" and prohibiting troubleshooting.
we almost literally torpedoed ourselves early in the war
The Aircraft, American
The Douglass TBD "Devastator"
Crew: 3, Pilot, Torpedo Officer/Navigator, Radioman Gunner
Range: 455 miles
Speed: 206 miles per hour.
Armament: 1 forward firing .30 caliber machine gun, one .30 machine gun in the rear cockpit.
I Mk 13 Torpedo, or one 1,000 pound bomb, or2 500 pound bombs, or 12 100 pound bombs
This was a very advanced aircraft in 1935 when first delivered but by 1942 was outclassed by almost everything, slow, sluggish and with a comparatively light payload it was retired in mid 1942 due partly to its obsolescence but mostly due to all most all of them having been lost in combat.
The Graumann TBF "Avenger'
Crew: 3, essentially the same as the TBD
Range: 900 miles
Armament: 1 - .30 cal. mg nose, 2 - .50 cal mg wings, 1 - .50 mg dorsal turret, 1 - .30 mg ventral tunnel.
1 Torpedo, Mk 13 or anti submarine homing "Fido" most common
or 2,000 pounds of bombs.
8 3.5" or 5" High Velocity Aerial Rockets
Bomb and torpedo payload carried internally.
From the outhouse to the penthouse. The gold standard of torpedo planes, almost 10,000 built. The last user didn't retire them until 1960.
Douglass SBD "Dauntless."
Crew: 2 pilot, radio operator/gunner
Speed: 255 mph.
Range: 300 miles
Armament: 2 - 50 cal machine guns in the engine cowling. One or two .30 caliber machine guns in the rear cockpit.
2,250 pounds of bombs in various configurations
Interestingly it had a second set of controls minus the landing gear let down in the rear cockpit. Some pilots would regularly let the rear seat guy take the controls for a while. More rear seater than you would think eventually became pilots.
the best carrier borne dive bomber pre 1944 and a case could be made for all time. Like its counter part the Japanese D3Y it destroyed more Japanese shipping than any other type. It performed very well re Enforcing the CAP with some pilots actually being transferred to fighters. As a pure dive bomber only the Stuka with its 90 degree dive and automatic pull out was probably its equal and you didn't see those on ships, though the Stuka sure sank a lot of ships.
Grauman F4F "Wildcat"
Crew: 1
Speed: 331 mph
Climb: 2,303 ft. min
Range: 700 miles
Armament: 4 - .50 cal. machine guns.
Grossly inferior on paper to its early war opponents in the pacific, it was especially handicapped by an abysmal climb rate. BUT a combination of ruggedness, fine piloting, and tactics allowed it to mostly hold its own. Even after superior types appeared it retained a niche on escort carriers and soldiered on for the whole war.
Range = Combat radius for all planes, both sides.
barretcreek
02-16-2022, 04:10
So are we preparing to fight the 'last war' except with missiles?
jon_norstog
02-16-2022, 05:42
So are we preparing to fight the 'last war' except with missiles?
Not mentioning any names, but I think a certain country has been working for 30+ years on ways to take out our CVAs.
jn
A terrific book from both the US and Japanese perspectives on Midway, which was the decisive carrier battle of the early war.
https://www.amazon.com/Shattered-Sword-audiobook/dp/B07QFB2BLX/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1JAUZA4K3XNZE&keywords=shattered+sword&qid=1645063213&sprefix=shattered+sword%2Caps%2C162&sr=8-1
Not that it has to be bought from Jeff Bezos of course.
The Men
The Japanese:
The Japanese military system, while it looked similar to European models and adopted much from them was also profoundly different. The officer class was more restrictive and the soldier, or sailor regardless of specialty was merely "The Sword of the Emperor." It was his entire value. In this scheme the vast majority of aircrews were enlisted men, including the pilots who were petty officers. They were also almost unbelievably well trained. Japanese pilots, especially were the benficiaries of intensive training that lasted for years and resulted in a corps of naval aviators of almost unparaled skill. The other crew members, middle seaters in torpedo planes and the radio operator/gunners were highly skilled and all were instilled through rigorous indoctrination in the defense of the God Emperor and the Empire of Japan. A quick word on radio operator/gunners. Gunner was their secondary role. All were proficient in Morse Code and were responsible for maintaining the communications link with the fleet. Unlike the U.S. Navy the highest ranking crew member of an aircraft was the aircraft commander regardless of job on his ship.
The bad news. The Japanese started the war with about 1,000 extremely well trained air crew who could not be replaced in that skill level if lost. Especially the pilots.
Speaking of radios. Much has been made of the practice of land based navy units removing their radios to save weight. This was out of the question in the carriers. Getting home was a big deal.
The ships were crewed by men trained through relentless hazing and beatings that could and did results in what anywhere else would have been an unacceptable number of suicides even in the Russian military. The Japanese sailors who crewed the Imperial Navy's ships were, resultingly, instantly obedient and incredibly brave. They were also pretty darned efficient while being also pretty darned inflexible.
The Americans:
American pilots were no slackers. The average American pilot of 1942 was extremely well trained and usually a long serving highly motivated veteran, Pearl Harbor motivated them more. Their back seaters, who had the same roles as Sons of Nippon were every bit as proficient as their Japanese equivalents. American training was more flexible, quicker and very good. It would pay off later.
The men who crewed the ships had higher mechanical skills when enlisted than the average Japanese equivalent which did make a difference, especially when training new people. American training while strict was also more humane, geared to not just to compliance but allowing a bit of innovation which also paid off.
The Japanese had an initial advantage but it was surprisingly short lived.
barretcreek
02-17-2022, 07:26
This is getting into 'thread drift' but we had a carrier war because we needed to control the seas in order to go island hopping. China wants Taiwan and to turn the westpac into their exclusive economic zone. Does this call for the same reaction?
The Battles, 1942
The carrier strike forces fought four major battles in the central and southwest pacific in 1942. There was a lot of feeling out, both sides were pretty much operating without a net. The battles were also closely fought between roughly matched personnel using roughly matched equipment. American superiority in signals intelligence was a major factor.
The Japanese maintained a numerical superiority in carriers even after Midway.
The orders of battle will be attached to each post, they can be quite interesting.
The Coral Sea
After Pearl Harbor the Japanese pressed their advantage, seizing the fuel resources that were there principal objective in Southeast Asia, and expanding far into the central Pacific. They also conducted a series of carrier raids that rendered the Royal Navy almost combat ineffective for a spell in the southwest pacific and Indian Ocean requiring the deployment of forces needed elsewhere.
The Japanese now plotted the next move. Thought was given to an invasion of Northern Australia, an idea so far fetched it was rejected almost out of hand. Instead it was decided to re inforce the big base at Rabaul by capturing Tulagi in the eastern Solomons and Port Moresby in New Guinea. Naval close air cover was to be provided by the CVL Shoho, distant cover by the big CVs Shokaku and Zuikaku and their escort screens.
Unfortunately for the Japanese we were reading their mail to the extent that we knew something was up and about where it would happen.
When the Yorktown and the Lexington with a surprisingly large screen showed up to contest the invasion it was a surprise to say the very least. The really bad news was the Americans were between the Japanese heavy cover CVs and the invasion force. The good news, this was also an opportunity to, at least partly correct the mistakes of Pearl Harbor.
Misidentifications limited the success of the first days fighting, but if you think you've found a carrier find an oiler and a destroyer, why waste the ordnance. So when a carrier contact turned out to be the detatched fleet oiler Neosho and Destroyer Sims, 36 D3Y Vals promptly demolished the Neosho and Sims before returning to base to re arm. The Americans had a better day finding the CVL Shoho. A quick note here on attrition. The Japanese were already starting to feel a pinch in planes and pilots. Hosho normally had an air group of 30. On this day she carried 18, 6 "Kate" torpedo planes and a mixed bag Zero and obsolete A5M2 "Claude" fighters. The US strike had been sent to find a carrier and they did. 53 Dauntless dive bombers and 22 Devastator torpedo bombers escorted by 18 Wildcats bored in. The Japanese had six Zeros and two Claudes in the Cap. The plight of the Shoho was near indescribable. The hits were almost uncountable. Even the Devastators looked good. Out of a crew of almost 900 less than 300 survived.
During councils of war at night both sides thought of attacking with their powerful screening forces. This was rejected due to the confusion of night fighting and the very high speed of fleet aircraft carriers making them very good at escaping.
The next day the fight resumed. The Americans launched a coordinated attack which resulted in three 1,000 pound bomb hits on Shokaku which put her out of the fight and in a yard for months. She almost foundered in a storm on the way back.
For their part the Japanese were now down half their strength but Zuikaku struck back hard. A "Hammer and Anvil" torpedo attack put two type 91s into Lexington. These were fatal, rupturing an avgas tank and eventually triggering explosions that sank the ship. The bomb hits were just window dressing. Yorktown took a 550 pound semi-armor piercing bomb (the heaviest a Val could carry) through the flight deck. This weapon penetrated four decks causing serious damage. As a side note; the battle between the US CAP Wildcats and Dauntless against the screening Zeros, while decided in favor of the "Zekes" was supposed to be one for the books.
While losses favored the Japanese, the battle was an American victory, the Rabaul offensive was thwarted and for the first time a Japanese offensive failed. An important issue, aircraft losses were about a wash but the Japanese lost enough more aircrew to matter.
A little note. This has been a subject of interest of mine for a very long time. New stuff comes up all the time that modifies the narrative, for example and things that complicate the popular concepts formed in the war and immdiately after are sometimes, not exactly ignored, but not given enough attention.
I am aware that almost all of us are pretty knowledgeable of what happened in the Pacific in WWII, especially at Midway. After all, it was our daddy's war. Hopefully this stuff I've accumulated will result in in a little bit of new, different, or even contrary information.
I'd been thinking about putting this out for a while and finally de-lazied myself enough to do it. I admit it's been a little fun to write.
I had hoped to post NAVWEPS orders of battle but they defy hot linking. They provide some fascinating stuff.
jon_norstog
02-18-2022, 08:21
My ex's father was on a can (DD) in that battle. His ship wasn't hit too bad. He told me they spent two days picking up survivors, what was left alive in the water after the sharks had their banquet.
jn
Excellent. Thanks Art.
I remember reading about later in the war with the Kamikazi attacks - the British Carrier (s) ?
had steel decks and suffered less than the American Carriers with their Wooden decks.
True ?
Excellent. Thanks Art.
I remember reading about later in the war with the Kamikazi attacks - the British Carrier (s) ?
had steel decks and suffered less than the American Carriers with their Wooden decks.
True ?
That is true, post 1940. It would not always defeat a big AP bomb but the Japanese weren't dropping a lot of those in 1945. There was a trade off though, the Brit carriers carried only about 60% of the planes of their American or Japanese counterparts. They boosted that some with deck parking. Did I mention the Brits also invented the armored flight deck that everybody used now??? There is a Youtube channel called "Armored Carriers" about those ships, you might check it out.
The videos deal with the other side of the world but shows Luftwaffe's attempt to sink one of these carrier that was part of "Operation Pedestal." First short video is background to a long series.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9hjfzXhoYI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ViAKdtarKZ4
blackhawknj
02-19-2022, 06:14
IIRC the Zero's long range was due a total absence of armor or any protection for the pilot.
In the Battle of the Phillipine Sea IJN Taihowas sunk by a single torpedo due to design flaws and poor damage control.
95% poor damage control but that's a story for a later episode.
IIRC the Zero's long range was due a total absence of armor or any protection for the pilot.
Just a word on this.
All Japanese naval aircraft were designed to achieve the longest possible range. This was part of the reason for the lightweight construction. They knew they would be flying over very long stretches of water.
Right after the landings on Guadalcanal the Japanese launched a strike looking for the American carriers of 27 very long range G4M Betty medium bombers escorted by Zeros of the elite Tainan Air Wing. The range was around 700 miles. That's further than London to Berlin. No other fighter at the time could possibly have flown that mission. They didn't find the carrier but attacked some transports covered by Wildcats of VF 5 From Saratoga. The Zeros shot down all 5 Wildcats for the loss of one bomber. No hits were scored on the transports. Without the Zero escort the Betty's would have been slaughtered.
Saburo Sakai speaking of the Zero's combat radius which their mechanics were able to tweak to almost 1,000 miles, said the luxury of never worrying about running out of fuel was of almost inestimable value in the vast reaches of the Pacific.
Midway June 7, 1942
Reading their mail....again. The staff infighting over the actual objective is well known but it all panned out.
The Japanese had had a back pocket plan for the Midway operation. The Doolittle Raid put the cycle into motion and the Japanese would bet the whole pile on the operation. The whole pile had problems that would only become apparent later.
Once the objective was known Midway was loaded up with every available aircraft. The scouting force was especially heavy. The Navy supplied 29 PBYs, 25 search and 4 strike. The Army supplied 19 B17s, 4 D models and the rest new Es. The B17s were equipped with "Tokyo Tanks" which were fitted in the bomb bays increasing their range but cutting their bomb loads in half. This would be one of the few time the Fortress would fulfill its original intended role as maritime reconaisance/strike bomber. The Army also supplied four B26s that would be armed with torpedoes. The fighters were all Marines, 7 F4F 3 Wildcats and 14 Brewster Buffalos (these had originally been sent on the Wake Island relief mission via the Saratoga) which was aborted. The Marines also had a bunch of obsolescent SB2 dive bomber. Speaking of Saratoga, she took a torpedo on Jan 11 from the I-6, she was unlucky that way, and was on her way back from a west coast yard. Her air groups were at Pearl Harbor, though and would provide replacements for losses at Coral Sea and sail with the task forces for the coming fight.
The Japanese used their normal wide ranging plan and used every single carrier available, including the old light carrier Hosho which sailed with Yamamoto's battle line. The Japanese had nothing like enough front line aircraft for their air groups and many second line models were on carriers headed for the Aleutians and with the invasion force. Hosho, for example carried 11 B4Y biplane torpedo bombers. CVL Zuiho with the invasion force had a listed compliment of 30 aircraft, 12 B5N Kates and a fighter group made up entirely of 12 A5M Claudes. In the strike group only the two Hiryu class ships carried their full compliment of aircraft and Kaga was down 20% on her air group. The Japanese went into the fight seriously outnumbered.
First blood was actually drawn by a strike PBY which stumbled onto an oiler group and put a torpedo into one. The tanker did not sink.
The rest is mostly well known. The Japanese struck Midway and annihilated the Marine fighters that piled straight in almost to a plane, and then bombed and strafed everything in sight. All of the Midway aircraft were launched and the dive and torpedo planes attacked the task force and were shot to badly shot up by the CAP causing no damage. The Avengers lost five of their six aircraft in this their first fight. As is well known this totally unexpected turn caused the Japanese to order another stirke. More bombings developed from B17s and from Midway making it very difficult to spot and launch a strike. The US carriers decided that speed was of the essence and launched their planes piece meal. The torpedo planes went first and were subjected to a military execution by the Japanese CAP. It would be their last day in combat. The hand full of survivors being withdrawn for training purposes and taken out of service completely by 1944. Then the Dauntless bombers appeared and the rest is history. Only Hiryu survived and her Admiral, Tamon Yamaguchi decided retribution was more important than saving his carrier for later use and rather than opening the range to take advantage of the superior combat radius of his aircraft charged the Americans (very samaurai that) and put himself in range of a counter strike. His pilots fatally damaged the Yorktown, but the Americans struck back with every SBD they could scratch together and ended the Hiryu's run right then and there.
The Japanese raced to the scene at flank speed including the four carriers spread among the other groups but the Americans, their air groups depleted had, like Elvis, left the building. Consideration was given to taking Midway with the remaining forces and that could have been done but the high command (Yamamoto) considered it and then declared the option a "bad hand."
Some things not generally known:
This is the only battle in which US aircrew losses exceeded those of the Japanese. Total air crew losses for the Japanese were 110 (mostly from Hiryu), the good guys lost 94 in the carrier torpedo planes alone. The captains of the other carriers had their priorities straight and evacuated their pilots first. Aoki Kajiro, Akagi's skipper interviewed after the war asked about his aircrew losses said they were very lucky to have only lost six (Akagi's total losses were under 300.) The idea that losses were much higher which persisted for many years was based on visual evidence of battle damage and not numbers.
What difference would the Zuikaku have made? The "Auspicious Crane" was unscathed at the Coral Sea but her air group was severely depleted . The Japanese had a policy of not mixing air groups so she didn't sail, what difference She had a rated complement of 84 aircraft, what difference would maybe even 60 more aircraft made for the Japanese. We had no such issue with Yorktown.
After the battle the Japanese still had more carriers available, than the Americans, including 4 CV. Their rate increase would never keep up. In fact the case is well taken that even if we'd lost Midway our numerical advantage by late 1944 would have been overwhelming.
Japanese rigidity paid a big price in their defeat. American flexibility played a big part in their win, with the aid of providence.
jon_norstog
02-20-2022, 12:33
My ex's father was on a can (DD) in that battle. His ship wasn't hit too bad. He told me they spent two days picking up survivors, what was left alive in the water after the sharks had their banquet.
jn
I take it back. His ship was in the Coral Sea fight, but the shark story came later, when the Indianapolis went down. My bad...
jn
A note on how naval aircraft casualties were counted.
In the Army a plane that, for example went down undamaged on a mission because of a mechanical problem or regained its base but had combat damage significant enough to write it off was an "operational loss" just as if it was lost in a training accident, it was not counted as a "combat loss." This obviously was a bit misleading though the "operational loss" might still server a potential purpose as a source of parts. The best example of how this could skew the numbers was the Regensberg-Schweinfurt raid in August 17, 1943. The 8th Air Force put up 376 B17s of which 60 were shot down. That's bad enough. Miller, in his excellent "Masters of the Air" exhaustive work on the bomber war in Europe reports that an even 100 returning aircraft were write offs that never flew again. That's over a 40% loss in equipment and verging on combat ineffectiveness.
The Navy was different. In a battle any aircraft lost for any reason during a battle was a combat loss, shot down, ditched regardless of the reason, deck accident, landed and pushed over the side even if still operational for deck operations purposes or down with the ship.
blackhawknj
02-23-2022, 08:51
Also I hsve read that at Midway the Japanese's most serious losses were not of pilots but of maintenance and engine room personnel.
Also I hsve read that at Midway the Japanese's most serious losses were not of pilots but of maintenance and engine room personnel.
That is correct. The Japanese had a shortage of trained mechanics and technical people from the jump. You might enjoy "Fire in the Sky" which is an excellent account of the air war in the South Pacific and deals with that in detail.
Japan wasn't mechanized at the level of the average person. We on the other hand were a nation of mechanics and tinkerers with an almost unlimited supply of mechanics and technicians including farm boys working on tractors and city kids tinkering with cars and building crystal radios.
There seem to be a lot of books called Fire in the Sky. Help.
There seem to be a lot of books called Fire in the Sky. Help.
Fire in The Sky
The Air War in the South Pacific
Eric M Bergerud
The Battle of the Eastern Solomons - August 24-25 1942
After Midway, the action shifted back to the Southwest Pacific. The United States invaded Guadalcanal and initially the defeat at Savo Island left the Marines stranded on the island.
In late August the the Japanese moved to reinforce Guadalcanal with the "Ichiki" Regiment, which was totally inadequate to the job by the way. The Japanese moved very heavy naval forces into the area including the CVs Shokaku and Zuikaku augmented by the light carrier Ryujo.
Ryujo was advanced to launch an air strike on the US Airfield on Guadalcanal (Henderson Field) that was supposed to be augment by G4M Japanese Navy medium land based bombers. The G4Ms were stopped by bad weather. The Ryujo strike, 6 B5N "Kates" escorted by 15 Zeros. The Kates bombed the field but the strike was ineffective. However, Ryujo was found by scout planes and a massive strike from Saratoga sent her to the bottom. Scouts from the Japanese found the Saratoga - Enterprise group and launched their strikes in the early afternoon. Poor management of the American CAP resulted in the late arrival of the Enterprise and Saratoga's Wildcats but they did manage some disruption of the dive bomber attacks but the Vals landed three hits on Enterprise damaging her badly, but superb American damage control actually allowed her to resume flight operations later in the day but the damage sent her back to the dock yard for repairs.
The battle disrupted the Japanese reinforcement efforts and the Japanese lost a carrier and more air craft and air crew. All in all it was an American victory. The Japanese who had to win big every time were now 0 for 3.
Torpedo Alley Sept. 1-15 1942.
Japanese submarines were not the most effective, partly because of design issues and partly because of strategic and tactical issues in their deployment. They did have their moments though, and early September 1942 was a high point.
On September 1, the Saratoga was torpedoed again, this time by I-26 and was back in drydock again. On September 15 I-19 fired the most devastating torpedo salvo in history. The Wasp and Hornet were conducting flight operations when I-19 achieved firing position and fired a six torpedo salvo at Wasp. Three hit the Wasp which probably would have sunk anyway but whose design defects made it a sure thing. One torpedo running long hit the Destroyer O'Brien that, due to underestimation of the damage foundered several weeks later. The last hit the Battleship North Carolina which was over the horizon, blew an 18 x 32 foot hole in the forward plating, jammed the number 1 16" mount. After counterflooding and shoring up North Carolina continued on at 25 knots, but would also need a drydock.
In two weeks the U.S. had two carriers taken out of action, one permanently.
Art
keep up the good work
blackhawknj
02-26-2022, 11:22
The Japanese "Long Lance " torpedo was vastly superior to our Mark XIV, which had serious defects which were not corrected until September 1943.
The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands - October 25-27 1942
The Japanese carrier forces mission in this action was to prevent the American aircraft carriers from intervening in an attempt to recapture the American airfield (Henderson Field) on Guadalcanal. It was also seen as a chance to inflict more casualties on the American Carrier forces. The Japanese bet the house on this committing four fleet carriers, Zuikaku, Shokaku, Hiyo (Hiyo developed electrical issues and didn't make the trip) and Junyo as well as the light carrier Zuiho, as well as four battleships, eight heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 25 destroyers. We were running on empty with our carrier forces with the Hornet and patched up Enterprise together with their screen of cruisers and destroyers. The American anti aircraft armament had been significantly upgraded by the replacement of the old quad 1.1" guns with director controlled 40 mm Bofors guns and additional 20 mm Oerlikons. The Bofors guns especially would become a grim reaper of Japanese aircraft.
The carrier groups found each other almost simultaneously and launched strikes. We got in the first lick when scouting Dauntlesses found the three fastest carriers and put a couple of bombs into the flight deck of Zuiho. The American and Japanese strikes actually passed each other and Zeros from Zuiho went after the Americans. While they shot down some of the American strike aircraft they reduced the escort for their own bombers which would have consequences a bit later.
The Shokaku had a brand new radar set on board. Now back then radar was art as much as science, but the operator on Shokaku had real talent and detected the Americans at 70 miles. This gave the crew the chance to purge the fuel lines which may have saved the ship, because the American strike scored multiple hits on the flight deck forcing Shokaku to withdraw. The Americans had trouble vectoring their CAP fighters to intercept the incoming strikes. The Wildcats did arrive belatedly and do some damage to the "Kate" torpedo planes. The Japanese strike attacking through sheets of tracers and flak you could walk on, suffered heavy losses but found Hornet and planted two torpedoes into her while dive bombers hit Enterprise with two semi armor piercing bombs and some damaging near misses. In this battle the Japanese were extremely aggressive, launching multiple strikes and repeatedly hitting the Damaged Hornet.
By now the Americans had had enough, Hornet was abandoned to her fate and Enterprise began to withdraw. The Japanese would find Hornet, survey the situation, and scuttle her with torpedoes.
The result was a Japanese victory by any measure. They had prevented the intervention of the American carriers in the offensive on Guadalcanal, sunk one carrier, damaged another. A destroyer was also sunk. They retained possession of the field and had more ships and aircraft remaining.
BUT!!! The Japanese lost 148 veteran aircrew including two strike leaders, 2 dive bomber group leaders and 3 torpedo squadron leaders. 49% of the torpedo squadron crews and 39% of the dive bomber crews that launched that day were KIA. 409 of the 706 aircrew that attacked Pearl Harbor were now dead. These were losses the Japanese naval air arm would never recover from.
October 1942 - June 1944
By the end of 1942 the Americans and the Japanese had succeeded in effectively sweeping each other's carrier forces from the Pacific. The United States had lost four fleet carriers. The very battered Enterprise was in Pearl Harbor for an extended stay which left the U.S. forces with the Saratoga. Since the "Sara" was not a carrier group we were stuck with borrowing the HMS Victorious from the Brits to operate with her. Victorious had a Brit Crew but operated a US Air Group. This patchwork arrangement was used for several months until the Enterprise became available.
The Japanese problem was different. They had Carriers, they had just lost so many experienced pilots that they didn't sortie. Sending the aircrew and aircraft of Carrier Division 5. Shokaku and Zuikaku to the south Pacific where they were almost entirely lost over a period of a year in a meatgrinder of air combat didn't help the matter at all. In the video below from the Japanese movie "Isoroku Yamamoto" the Japanese Admiral lays out a truly desperate scenario for victory. When he talks about the Third Fleet carriers he is actually talking about the Carrier Division 5 air groups, not the ships themselves. Also, while the Marianas was where the "last battle" Yamamoto talks about was actually fought there were other possible locations, including Formosa where they thought it might occur. The initiative was all with the Americans.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A91KrF4C9gw
The need for pilots was so desperate that what was unthinkable two years before was being done. Recruiting films in movie theaters.
https://www.youtbe.com/watch?v=Xho0KgKdJdE
I have tried every way I know to get the above link to work but no joy. If you want to watch it go to Youtube and type in WWII Japanese Pilot Recruiting Film.
The Americans spent their time building carriers and lots of them. The Essex Class fleet carriers would be the most numerous class of capital ships ever built with 24 completed in all. Add to them the light fleet carriers built on light and heavy cruiser hulls and you see how overwhelming things would be. We also had the advantage of having a lot more experienced pilots remaining than the Japanese and put new guys through and exacting and rigorous training program. Many of these new guys would see action in the Island Hopping campaigns and in the South Pacific before June of 1944.
New aircraft carriers post 1943; both the United States and Japan made aircraft carrier production a highest priority after the losses of the 1942 battles.
Japanese Aircraft Carriers:
For the Japanese these come in two varieties, those built which actually carried air wings and those which were completed after Japanese naval aviation ceased to exist. Those that were finished in time to carry air wings:
Taiho CV
27,700 tons
33 Knots
65 Aircraft
This is an interesting one. It was an armored carrier similar to the British ones. The Japanese intended to make more of these but construction was too expensive and they took too long to build.
Chitose class CVL
Chiyoda
Converted sea plane tenders
11,900 tons
30 Aircraft
29 Knots
These never carried an air group and spent most of their careers bobbing around the inland sea.
Unryu Class CV
Amagi
Katsugiri
22, 534 tons
34 Knots
65 Aircraft
Unryu was sunk by an American submarine while being used as a high speed supply ship hauling cargo to the Philippines.
Shinano CV
Converted battleship
71,859 tons
55 Aircraft
27 Knots
Shinano was actually a combination carrier/depot ship made to support other carriers, thus its relatively small air group. Sunk by an American submarine on a shakedown cruise.
American Carriers:
Essex Class CV
24 total construction 13 of which were built in time to see significant service in WW II.
27,100 tons
90-100 Aircraft
33 Knots
Independence class CVL
Converted light cruisers
9 ships, all commissioned in 1943
11,000 Tons
33 Aircraft
31 Knots
barretcreek
03-08-2022, 08:46
Art,
Will you go into the manner by which we were able to turn out increasing numbers of fairly competent fledgling aviators while IJN was not?
Art,
Will you go into the manner by which we were able to turn out increasing numbers of fairly competent fledgling aviators while IJN was not?
I mentioned that in a previous post but, essentially, the Japanese navy was running on empty on pilots by late 1943, and their program for new guys was by necessity more abbreviated and suffered from a lack of experienced men as instructors. We on the other hand had a lot more of the pilots we started the war with in 1943 and many of these men were rotated back as instructors. This gave us the luxury of being able to do a much more comprehensive training program for new pilots. Our new pilots who started to appear in mid - late 1943 were much better trained because we weren't in the desperation mode the Japanese were. Our new pilots obtained valuable experience in the southwest Pacific and the island hopping campaign along side an experienced corps of veterans.
When the Japanese started showing films in movie theaters recruiting pilots it was a sign they were in trouble. We never had a shortage of volunteers who wanted to fly.
Aircraft post 1942. New models and a major upgrade.
Top speeds are WEP (war emergency power.) Range is combat radius.
The Americans
The SB2C Helldiver
Crew 2: Pilot, Radio Operator Gunner
Speed : 295 mph
Range : 300 miles
Armament: 2x20mm cannon in the wings. 2x.30 cal. machine guns in rear upper fuselage, 4x.50 cal. machine guns in underwing pods (optional.) 2,000 bombs in a bomb bay or 1 torpedo, 8 High Velocity Aerial Rockets.
"The last dive bomber" had a long and troubled (some would say scandal plagued) development that led to investigations and congressional hearings. It has been argued that it was only marginally superior to the SBD Dauntless dive bomber it replaced. In fact at the "Battle of the Philippine Sea" where both types were engaged there were more losses of Helldivers than Dauntlesses.
The F6F Hellcat
Crew : Pilot
Speed : 391 mph
Rate of climb : 2,600 feet per minute
Range : 820 miles
Armament : 6x.50 cal. machine guns.
Superior to all models of the Zero it was designed to defeat in every area except low speed maneuverability and climb rate it was the master of the Japanese fighter once it came into service in 1943.
F4U1D Corsair
Crew : 1 Pilot
Speed: 425 mph
Climb : 3,200 fpm
Range: 800 miles
Armament: 6x.50 machine guns.
Not assigned to US carriers until late in the war, after the Brits had proven it capable of operating from them with some margin of safety.
The Japanese
The Nakajima B6N "Jill"
Crew : 3 Pilot, Observer/Bombardier/Navigator, Radio Operator / Gunner
Speed : 300 mph
Range: 900 miles
Armament: 1 7,7mm machine gun in rear cockpit, 1 7.7 mm machine gun in ventral tunnel. 1 Type 91 Torpedo, or 1,700 pounds of bombs, or 2,250 pounds of bombs (suicide attacker)
The replacement for the B5N Kate it was slow in development and never completely replaced it.
The Yokusuka D4Y "Judy"
Crew : 2 Pilot, Radio Operator/ Gunner
Speed: 340 mph
Range: 800 miles
Armament: 2 forward firing 7.7 mm machine guns, 1 7.7mm machine gun in rear cockpit, 1,100 pounds of bombs or 1,800 pounds of bombs (suicide attacker)
Replacement for the D3Y "Val" dive bomber it proved too heavy to operate off of some light carriers so the Val soldiered on. Due to its very high speed for a bomber it was sometimes used as a night fighter from land bases.
The A6M5 Zero series
Crew : 1 Pilot
Speed: 351 mph (365 mph WEP)
Rate of Climb: 3,300 fpm
Range: 900 miles
Armament: 1 13.2mm and 1 7,7mm mg in upper cowling, 2 x 20 mm cannon in the wings.
An attempt to remedy the deficiencies of the earlier Zeros. The wings were shortened and skin was thickened to improve dive speed taking "never exceed speed" from 360 mph in earlier versions to 410 to 460 mph depending on the variation of the A6M5 series making it capable of an actual dive. The 20 mm cannon were upgraded with a rate of fire increase from about 550 rounds per minute to 750 rounds per minute and an increase in ammunition from 60 to 125 rounds per gun. An armored wind screen and later armor for the pilots back were also added as were fire extinguishers for the wing fuel tanks. It was still inferior to both the Hellcat and later to the Corsair. Inferior Japanese pilots post 1943 didn't help either.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea, June 19-20 1944
Sorry for the delay getting back to this.
In the Summer of 1944 nearly 20 months had passed since the last battle between us and Japanese carrier forces. Both sides had been severely mauled in the carrier battles of 1942 and spent the time refitting and re equipping. The industrial power of the United States was beginning to tell as they were almost mass producing aircraft carriers, not to mention aircraft for them. US Pilots were better trained, had more combat experience and there were a lot more of them. On the other hand, the Japanese were mostly making up lost carrier tonnage by converting existing ships. They had had heavy aircraft losses, and more important heavy losses of pilots in the carrier battles of 1942 and the air battles of the South Pacific in 1943.
The Japanese had always counted on decisively winning a battle that would force the Americans into negotiations, and had had two unsuccessful bights of the apple at Pearl Harbor and Midway. The new decisive battle was to be on the ring of defenses that went through the Palaus and Carolines up through the Marianas.
The Americans got a big "heads up" when the Japanese plans were found by a Philippino Guerilla after the plane carrying them crashed. The Japanese plan was to destroy the fast carrier strike forces of the United States. The Americans assumed (incorrectly) that Japanese intentions were purely opposing the U.S. Invasion.
On June 12 US Airstrikes hit the island of Saipan. The Japanese Combined Fleet sortied as soon as it could raise steam. It's carrier striking force consisted of three squadrons of carrier grouped by size and speed. The three biggest and fastest carriers, Shokaku, Zuikaku, and the brand new Taiho formed the First Squadron, three fast light carriers formed another and the two slower fleet carriers, Hiyo and Junyo along with an equally slow light carrier formed the third. They embarked about 540 aircraft, almost all new or upgraded types. In addition the Japanese could count on about three hundred aircraft of all types based in the Mariannas. The Americans deployed four groups of carriers. All had 2 CV, and CVL except for one which had one CV and 2 CVL. The American carriers embarked about 900 aircraft.
The Japanese counted on the range advantage of their aircraft and the bases in the Marianas to allow them to hit without being hit back
American submarines detected the Japanese on the 15th.
With the priority to protect the beach head on Saipan the slow battleships and escort carriers were assigned to protect the landings. The fast carriers to engage the Japanese. A "gun line" of fast battleships. cruisers and destroyers was placed between the Japanese and the carriers to engage any Japanese aircraft that got through the combat air patrol.
On the morning of the 19th of June, before sunrise, the Japanese began a search for the American Carriers. A Zero carrying a bomb found the Americans, radioed their position, began a bombing run on a picket destroyer and was promptly shot down.
The Japanese then launched an attack with their land based aircraft which resulted in the loss of over 30 of their aircraft in exchange for one Hellcat. At about the same time the first carrier strike was detected on US radar, the fighters were recalled and vectored to the incoming strike (American problems with coordinating their CAP had been completely solved.) Four Japanese strikes resulted in 361 aircraft lost in aerial combat or to the anti aircraft fire of the "gun line" and the carriers and their screen, in exchange for a hand full of US losses. The problem the US had, though, was the Japanese were well outside the range of US search aircraft so remained undetected.
The Japanese were out of range of US scout aircraft but not US Submarines. USS Albacore put a single torpedo into the Taiho. This should have been easily survivable but the losses of Japanese technicians and mechanics included damage control. Taiho's damage control officer was very young and very inexperienced. Without going into detail every decision he made made the situation worse. Six hours after being hit a massive fuel vapor explosion destroyed the ship.
The USS Cavalla later put four torpedoes into the Shokaku. Never a lucky ship (she seemed to take damage in every engagement,) the Shokaku's luck ran out completely. This time her wounds were not survivable and she joined Taiho on the bottom.
Even with only 150 combat worthy aircraft remaining the Japanese decided to continue the battle but late in the afternoon an American scout found the Japanese at the extreme limit of the range of American aircraft. The Americans launched 250 aircraft at extreme range before getting an update that the Japanese were already, essentially out of range. The first strike was allowed to continue but a second cancelled. The Japanese had 35 Zeros in their CAP which was pretty good by 1942 standards but even though they were ably handled by the best remaining pilots, no where near capable of dealing with this strike. The Americans sank the Carrier Hiyo, and damaged some other ships. After subtracting the planes lost to the Americans in combat in this strike and the ones that went down with the Hiyo the Japanese had less than 50 aircraft left.
Japan had lost its last real task force. It still had carriers and would build more but would never come close to reconstituting its air groups.
After the war, when Adm. Jisuboro Ozawa who commanded the carriers at the Philippine Sea, was asked, after the war, about the quality of Japanese aircraft and pilots over the course of the war; his reply was "the planes got better the pilots got worse." This was true of Japanese naval personnel overall, they simply could not replace personnel with men of equal quality.
Thanks for the great posts Art..
Dan in NH
04-23-2022, 03:30
Great post Art. I enjoyed reading it
barretcreek
04-23-2022, 04:30
Thank You, Art. Great post.
blackhawknj
04-23-2022, 06:00
IJN Taiho was sunk by a single torpedo in the Battle of the Phillipine Sea.
There were the USS Sable and USS Wolverine-the only coal fired freshwater aircraft carriers. They were used to train pilots in takeoffs and landings, deck crews.
Quick note, the survivability of British carriers wasn't just due to their armored decks. Their aviation gasoline was was stored in cylindrical tanks in cofferdams filled with sea water. American and Japanese carriers had steel tanks attached to the structure of the ship which allowed them to carry more fuel but made them vulnerable to cracking when bombs, or Torpedoes hit the ships. The great killer of American and Japanese carriers was their own aviation fuel leaking from cracked tanks and vaporizing after bomb, or especially torpedo hits.
Another quick note.
June 1944 was a really, really bad month for the Axis. In addition to the battle of the Philippine Sea and the loss of the Mariana Islands; The Americans and British opened a second front in Europe with the Normandy invasion. On the Eastern Front the Russians launched "Operation Bagration" which destroyed the German Army Group Center.
blackhawknj
04-24-2022, 04:18
In February 1942 2 Navy officers who were came from the NYC Fire department pointed out the dangers to carriers from the aviation fuel lines. Their solution-which was adopted-was to bleed inert gasses from the ship's engines into them when they were not in use.
Correct, and purging the fuel lines when not in use was common in all navies. Unfortunately that didn't help if the lines were in use which was often. That practice saved the Japanese carrier Shokaku at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands when she was hit by at least four and possibly as many as six heavy bombs. Re arming and re fueling with the aircraft on the flight deck was also done at times.
Major Tom
05-04-2022, 03:26
There was a torpedo testing site in the mountains above/near Monrovia, CA. Quite visible today is a long concrete 'slide' into a lake. My father-in-law took me up there a few years back.
There was a torpedo testing site in the mountains above/near Monrovia, CA. Quite visible today is a long concrete 'slide' into a lake. My father-in-law took me up there a few years back.
It's too bad we weren't testing torpedoes prior to 1941. We might have shortened the war.
War, what's it good for? Well, some experimental work inspired.
Japanese material and logistical problems post 1943.
Once the American submarine campaign cranked up in late 1943 supplies of vital supplies became critically cramped. By mid 1944 Japan was so low on tanker tonnage they could no longer move enough oil from their conquests in Southeast Asia to refineries. They did catch a break though, with Malayan oil. Malayan is the lightest, sweetest crude in the world, and while not the best option it could be used to fuel ships right out of the ground. Japanese warships increasingly, after mid 1943. would fuel straight from the fields. Mainland Japan was not so lucky.
The problems weren't just with oil. Strategic metals were in critically short supply, for example Japanese aircraft started having failures due to improper stop gap alloys being used resulting in failures such as collapsing landing gear in anything like a hard landing.
The Japanese were hurting in aircraft and especially aircrews but attrition was hurting them in a lot of other areas. The surface war had been fought by the Japanese mostly with destroyers and due to attrition by mid 1944 they were desperately short of good escort vessels. At the Battle of the Philippine sea the Japanese Carrier Squadron 1 consisting of their three best ships was escorted by only 7 destroyers. Did that have something to do with two of the ships being sunk by submarines...? Well it sure didn't help. None of the American carrier groups in the Philippine Sea were escorted by fewer than 9 destroyers and TF 58.3 (2CV and 2 CVL) was escorted by 12. The American destroyers also had much superior anti submarine technology.
By the spring of 1944 the Japanese were running on empty in a lot of areas, more than mentioned above.
jon_norstog
06-15-2022, 11:02
An American friend of mine who lived in Japan for years told me that the Japanese military lost the war because they couldn't type fast enough. He said there WAS a typewriter with all the necessary katakana and kanji letters and ideographs, but it was a yard wide and there weren't enough of them. And probably not enough soldiers and sailors who could use one.
That is his theory and the more I think about it, a pretty good one. Must have been a contributing factor that started causing delays and SNAFUs early in the war. As long as Japanese forces held the initiative, it probably didn't matter too much. After that things went south for them and they couldn't type fast enough to maintain the flow of documents, and thus of men, ships and materiel.
jn
blackhawknj
06-17-2022, 08:53
The Japanese lost the war because, like the Germans and Italians.
1.They greatly overestimated their own abilities and capabilities and
2.They greatly underestimated their enemies.
Yamamoto, who had spent time in the US, learned English and had some understanding of US capabilities and our mentality, warned against underestimating us, and had Hitler not declared war on us with no notice to his high command, the Japanese might have had to face us with a Pacific only war effort.
Cape Engano, the Death Ride of the Japanese Fast Carrier Striking Force. October 24-26 1944.
The Americans didn't take long to press home the advantages from the slaughter of the Japanese aircraft at the Philippine Sea. Just four months later they struck at the Philippines. The Japanese planned at this point to defend the islands with surface forces only. Four carriers, the CV Zuikaku, and the light fleet carriers Chioyada, Chitose and Zuiho with 108 aircraft were deployed with the fleet. These were purely a decoy force to lure the American carriers away from the Japanese surface forces. The mission of destroying the American landing ships and beaches was to be assigned to Japans still powerful surface forces. The Japanese had just commissioned two of the three CVs of the Unryu class but what would have been the point of spreading 108 aircraft between 6 carriers instead of four? Also attached were the two hybrid battleship carriers of the Ise class. These ships never launched a strike and their conversion did nothing but deprive the Japanese of two powerful Surface units.
The Americans didn't find the Japanese promptly and after waiting a sufficient period Admiral Ozawa started to withdraw his carriers. He then received an order to stay, "trusting the providence of heaven."
So Trusting in the providence of heaven Ozawa launched a strike of 75 aircraft on the U.S. Third Fleet. These aircraft were ordered not to return to their ships but to land at bases in the Philippines. 38 aircraft, mostly A6MN5 Zeros but also a couple of D3Y Vals were kept back as a CAP.
The aircraft from the Japanese strike were shot down almost to a plane without inflicting any damage. The Americans had over 600 aircraft available in the Third Fleet in the area and the resulting American strikes sank three of the four Japanese carriers (Zuikaku again proved the toughness of her class absorbing at least six torpedo and three 500 pound bomb hits before sinking.) The Chiyoda was badly, damaged, left dead in the water and, fighting to the end sunk by an American cruiser/destroyer group.
After the war Adm. Toyoda, the naval chief of staff, said the plan was for the fleet not to return if not victorious. Why should it? Ships returning to Japan could not be refueled and ships returning to Singapore could not be re repaired or re supplied. The Japanese on the spot didn't follow the plan and did not follow through to attack the American beachheads. Once again the Japanese didn't follow up an advance and in the face of heavy opposition by inferior forces in the battle off Samar, withdrew.
After the battle Toyoda proved right. The heavy cruisers and destroyers that escaped to Singapore couldn't be repaired though some made transport runs until almost the end of the war as mostly British units picked them off one at a time. The units in Japan had insufficient fuel for any serious offensive action. The Battleship Nagato and battlecruiser Haruna didn't join the Yamato in her own suicide mission mostly due to lack of fuel. The remaining half dozen carriers had no aircraft and the ones in decent condition were used as repatriation ships after the war.
The Japanese knew they had to win every encounter with the U.S. carrier forces decisively. They won one of the six and that victory was hardly overwhelming. Although. by the beginning of 1943, we and the Japanese were aware of American superiority in naval aircraft and their carriers neither seemed to have quite realized how overwhelming American supremacy would be. In reality, the Japanese barely had a chance.
Blackhawknj is pretty much right on with his above post.
After the war surviving Japanese ships of all sizes, including the carriers were used to repatriate Japanese military and civilian personnel from all over Asia and the Pacific. This is Katsuragi in 1946 with military and civilian personnel being returned to Japan. The hanger decks of the remaining carriers provided accommodations for hundreds, in come cases thousands of personnel. Katsuragi was scrapped beginning at the end of 1946.
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