Monte Cassino

[Sako]

You could ask that about the whole bloody Italian Campaign. Why would ANYONE want to land in Italy?

As Sid noted, Churchill was obsessed with 'the soft under-belly of Europe'. And not for the first time. He committed political suicide when he ordered the invasion of Gallipoli during WWI.

That is true Churchhill never got to be the Queen of England.

[jjrothWA]

I must disagree about Gallipoli, the strategy was sound, the operational commanders were jerks.

The RN admiral in command had obsolete battleships that were expendable for clearing the Dardanelles strait minefields but did not want to loose them.
and the Ottoman troops were playing on HOME turf.

Read the first two books of Manchester's biography of Churchill.

For WWII, read the book "An Army at Dawn", about the North African Campaign and why Churchill wanted to the soft underbelly of Europe.

[Vern Humphrey]

Just finished a book on Gallipoli. It was doomed from the start. The "Navy Only" approach couldn't possibly have worked -- for one thing, the Turks could lay mines faster than the British could clear them, and British gunnery wasn't up to successfully dueling with the Turkish defense.

The Turks communicated better, had better situational awareness, and successfully operated inside the British decision cycle.

[blackhawknj]

Gallipoli might have succeeded if the planning had been more careful and thorough, it was very slipshod, very much a too quickly improvised operation.
Battleships were unsuited for that sort of shore bombardment, their trajectory was too flat. And yes, they badly underestimated the Turks.

[Vern Humphrey]

Gallipoli might have succeeded if the planning had been more careful and thorough, it was very slipshod, very much a too quickly improvised operation.
Battleships were unsuited for that sort of shore bombardment, their trajectory was too flat. And yes, they badly underestimated the Turks.

The simple point is, why would the British think they could do on Gallipoli what they could not do in France? For them to succeed, they needed to be able to fight a maneuver campaign. Instead, at Gallipoli as in France, they were stuck in trench warfare.

They also had very poor communications and situational awareness. For example, at Suvla they sent a telegraph terminal ashore. But it was manned by naval ratings, who knew nothing about the Army and there were no provisions for forwarding messages once they arrived ashore. Similarly, there were no provisions for the commander ashore to send messages back to the telegraph station.

[Jeff L]

Having been there, it is a strategic high ground. You can see for miles in all directions.

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Monte+Cassino/@41.4824659,13.6334272,10.8z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x133abbf093da4079:0x6c171f25c437c96f!8m2!3d41.4916194!4d13.8158578!5m1!1e4

[Vern Humphrey]

Having been there, it is a strategic high ground. You can see for miles in all directions.
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Mo...158578!5m1!1e4

Tactical high ground -- "strategic" refers to winning wars. "Operational art" is planning and conducting campaigns. "Tactics" is actual fighting.

[Jeff L]

You get my point. Who ever was up there controls the entire valley with the ability to call in artillery or air strike coordinates.