LN1903 Debate question (NOT for the reason you're thinking)

[Johnny P]

Prior to the end of WWI the U.S. Military had issued contracts for 3,025,000 Model 1911 pistols in addition to those already being supplied by Colt. Of that number Remington-UMC delivered something under 22,000 pistols. Virtually as soon as the war ended the contracts were cancelled. Colt's contract was also cancelled at the same time, and no more pistols were ordered until 1924, when 10,000 were ordered.

[jgaynor]

{snip}
Hatcher's notebook covers the mellurgy in detail. But there's gotta be more to the story. Politics and the chess match.

Put yourself in a high ranking ordnance department official or General's position....

Are you gonna say "nah we got this. Go ahead and scale us down, the war is over, we'll just crank out whatever we can and start replacing units as we can with whatever you give us." Or are you going to a serious issue worse to maintain your Congressional funding? Again on Capital Hill with a Budget committee this is a giant chess match as I see it.

The most important consideration in this argument is the simple fact that rifle production and the costs there of, were a mere pimple on the ass of all the WW1 US ordnance expenditures.

PS I hate to digress into the technicalities of the '03 failures but some of the same old misunderstandings are still being repeated today.
1. The weak receiver issue had NOTHING to do with heat treatment. A tiny percentage of receivers were "burned" in the forge shop. Those were the weak ones.
2 Forge temperatures were judged by eye until pyrometers were mandated. When the receivers went for heat treatment they were packed inside closed containers filled with charcoal. Eyeballing receivers during heat treatment was impossible.

[Smokeeaterpilot]

The most important consideration in this argument is the simple fact that rifle production and the costs there of, were a mere pimple on the ass of all the WW1 US ordnance expenditures.

PS I hate to digress into the technicalities of the '03 failures but some of the same old misunderstandings are still being repeated today.
1. The weak receiver issue had NOTHING to do with heat treatment. A tiny percentage of receivers were "burned" in the forge shop. Those were the weak ones.
2 Forge temperatures were judged by eye until pyrometers were mandated. When the receivers went for heat treatment they were packed inside closed containers filled with charcoal. Eyeballing receivers during heat treatment was impossible.

I'm not arguing the either way with regards to the "pimple on the ass" on how much rifle production took up of the ordnance department's budget.

What I'm saying is I don't have the data to argue it one way or another. But I'm not sure producing the standard service rifle for the entire US military would be small. Now it may be small with regards to all ordnance produced. But to the Springfield Armory and Rock Island Arsenal production capabilities, what did it represent to their capacities. How much of their budget went to producing the standard service rifle for the entire US military. Was this an attempt of taking a small issue and saying "hey the war's over, how to we justify everyone's job?"

Again, I don't have this data.

These numbers would give more clues to what happened behind the scenes. Everything comes back to money. Follow the money and find the source of the argument.

Now this could be a "red herring" but there isn't any information to come to a conclusion either way.

[firstflabn]

A sure sign this discussion is in big trouble is when I have to save it with my metallurgical expertise. But, since in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king, I'll do like OJ and take a stab at it.

First, Hatcher was no metallurgist. Even in the context of the science of his day, he was a beginner. I think he says he took ONE course in metallurgy. He says a couple of really stupid things in his Notebook, but that discussion can wait for another day.

A couple of comments:

1. According to a chart prepared by the Tempil stick folks (if you don't know what a Tempil stick is, stop reading and go find out, you won't benefit by going further now), there is only about a 100 deg F difference between the top of the safe forging temp range and the bottom of the burnt temp range. Therefore, it is ludicrous to believe SA didn't have pyrometers in their forge shop, Hatcher or no. Further, the FY18 report in Brophy's SA book says they installed improved pyrometers in the hardening shop. Why would they have the good stuff - and upgrade it - to use on a much less critical operation at a 1000 F lower temp and none at all in the forging shop?

If the pre-1918 forge temp range is the same as the 1942 spec presented in Brophy (p. 549) - 2300-2340 F - then SA is into the 100 deg F no mans land between safely forging and burning.

2. The plot thickens - as carbon content rises, the burnt temp drops. Brophy shows a carbon range of .30 to .38 for receivers. Moving from .30 to .38 LOWERS the burnt temp by about 30 deg F. Interestingly, the FY18 report celebrates their brand new chemical lab which allows them to (apparently for the first time) do a chemical analysis "for all the steel entering into components or tools." This smells like they previously had only checked the paperwork from the outside supplier providing the receiver blanks. 30 deg may matter if you're bumping up against the safe max temp already.

3. According to the Tempil chart, the forging range is a bit over 600 F wide. Thus, SA wrote specs to operate at the tippy top of the safe range. They might have been worried about forging laps, etc., but that kind of defect would probably have been revealed in proof firing - so, they were concerned about budget (in peacetime) and production (in wartime), not burnt steel.

4. Interpreting the Tempil chart on my ancient monitor, there is no discernable difference in color between the top of the safe range and the bottom of the burnt range (100 F, remember). I'd have to ask someone with foundry experience, but Hatcher's story sounds suspect to me - he may not have known enough to call BS on the "cloudy days" cover story.

3. Another reference I have warns that care must be taken when working forgings that have been heated to near the max safe forging temp as getting in too big a hurry (whomping with the whomper) will raise the forging's temp from friction. My bet is that when that happens, the chewy chocolate center is hotter than the outside, so even modern pyrometers would not help.

I suspect this knowledge existed in heavy industries doing really big pieces - locomotive, ship building, hydropower, etc., but that the combination of stodgy old ordnance officers and budget parsimony created an avoidable (but inevitable) f*ck up.

What I wish I could find out is whether the acid etch test (to identify burnt steel) was available in those other industries before WWI. I have no experience with it, but from my materials lab knowledge it doesn't look too tough to perform and interpret. It's a destructive test, but I wonder if the edge of the tang or one side of the recoil lug could be tested and still have a functioning receiver (with possibility of leaving no more than a blemish). I'm no longer in the testing business, so I don't know who to call for a freebie. If it could be done and only leave a minor boo boo, somebody could have a booming business. The test is 100% reliable, though the interpretaion is visual, so might need a practiced eye.

I'm tired of hearing myself type, so I'm out.

[Southron]

Well, regarding the "politics" in 1917....President Wilson had won re-election in 1916 with the slogan: "He Kept Us Out Of the European War."

Beginning in 1914 (shortly after the outbreak of World War I) the J.P. Morgan Bank had signed an agreement with the British government that the Morgan Bank would perform ALL THE PURCHASING IN THE UNITED STATES for the British war effort. Of course, the Morgan Bank was loaning the British government millions and millions of dollars to pay for the purchases they were making. Now these "war supplies" were far more than just guns and ammunition but also included food to feed the British Armies and to a certain extent the British civilian population, horses and mules, cloth and clothing for British Army uniforms and tents,trucks, cars, medical supplies-literally anything and everything the British government required to sustain their war effort.

The money required for this massive purchasing of supplies was far beyond the means of the Morgan Bank. Hence the Morgan Bank had to resort to borrowing money from other American Banks all over the United States. This borrowing literally drained the reserves of most American Banks.

By the Spring of 1917, the "money supply" of the Morgan Bank was drained and so too the money supply of most American Banks that had loaned the Morgan Bank money to support the British. In February of 1917 the Imperial German Government sent the "Zimmerman Telegram" to the government of Mexico. The telegram promised that IF Mexico declared war on the U.S., the German government would supply funds to the Mexican government and form an alliance with Mexico. The idea behind the German Alliance was that Mexico could re-conquer the states of Texas, New Mexico, Nevada, and California.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimmermann_Telegram

The telegram was intercepted by British Intelligence and made public in the United States, this enraged the American population. Another factor was in the Spring of 1917 German submarines started sinking American ships, FLYING THE AMERICAN FLAG carrying supplies to Britain.The end result was that the United States declared war on Germany in April of 1917.

So, the Morgan Bank "Lucked Out" and avoided bankruptcy. For with the declaration of war on Germany, the United States became an ally of the British and the U.S. Treasury made good the loans that the Morgan Bank had made to the British. Uncle Sugar also took over supplying our British ally with the material the British needed to continue the war on their part.

So, my point is with the U.S. entry into World War I, the huge battles taking place in Europe the "Low Number Scandal" probably didn't get much (if any) newsprint with all the other world shaking events taking place then.

[Art]

For those of you who wonder why the Marines kept their low number '03s in service I suggest Maj. Culver's monograph on the subject which is s "sticky" on this forum.

[louis]

I 've read it (Maj. Culver) long ago, just that I also know about all the scandals political, industrial and the stock exchange that took place during and before this time period some where extreme (ie American aircraft, parts and delivery were almost none existent but they took in plenty of money), have you read Smedly Butlers "War is a Racket"? Or his talks about the use of the Marine Corps for big corporations in foreign lands, so all of what everyone is saying adds up to more scandals? But I'm also very cautious.

[Dan Shapiro]

Wasn't Smedly Butlers "War is a Racket" written after he was passed over for Commandant?

[Art]

Wasn't Smedly Butlers "War is a Racket" written after he was passed over for Commandant?

Yep, but that probably had little to do with him writing the book. The Marine Corps has produced more than its share of characters and none more eccentric than Butler. He came from a very politically connected family; his father had been a judge and congressman. He lied about his age to get into the Corps basically giving up a soft life. He was also hopelessly insubordinate and its amazing he was ever even a candidate for commandant. This is a man who won two MoH (three if you count the Marine Corps Brevet Medal he got during the period Officers weren't eligible for the MoH) and tried to give the first one back because he felt he didn't deserve it (he was ordered to accept and wear the medal.) By WW I he had ticked so many people off he was put in charge of docks in France and denied a combat assignment. In 1924 the Corps actually sort of loaned him to the City of Philadelphia to be their Police Commissioner and was forced out after two years for enforcing the law too equitably (rich people didn't like their parties raided for liquor violations and cracking down on cop corruption really didn't prove that popular either) which proves you can be too honest for your own good. In light of the history of the man I think he would have written "War is a Racket" even if he had been selected for Commandant.

Evans Carlson was another one, intellectually gifted and almost fanatically brave this son of a Congregationalist preacher rose from the rank of private to Brigadier General. he won three Navy Crosses founded the Marine Raiders and led the raid on Makin Atoll. He is sometimes considered the father of modern special forces. But..... his ChiCom sympathies ran so deep that the joke in the Corps was that Carlson may have been Red but he wasn't yellow. He actually organized his Raider unit using principles he learned while assigned as an observer of Mao's 8th Route Army, and no that didn't endear him to the Corps but he had become a personal friend of the Roosevelts. Speaking of the Roosevelts, he used his personal connections with them to change the TO&E and structure of his unit essentially on his own authority. It's probably a good thing for him that he died shortly after the war, the post war government wouldn't have appreciated him a bit.

[louis]

I totally agree with you Art, Smedly Butler also tried to have Mussolini arrested because his limo or entourage ran over and killed someone when he was acting police chief. And the expression "Gung Ho" Came from Carlson's experience with the reds. But I guess we are going in a totally different direction here from the original posting. You should read "Black Bagdad" by John Craige a former USMC officer stationed in Haiti during early 1900's and he returned as a political advisor after WW1 and then wrote "Cannibal Cousins". Both are very insightful of this time period both books are very difficult to find. But interesting reading.

[John Sukey]

Study the reason Crozier didn't allow our Army to be equipped with the Lewis gun and get back to me.

The reason; Crozier HATED Lewis because he had written an unflattering but true report about him.
Crozier came up with the CRAP that the Lewis gun had to be "tested" regardless of the fact that it had been use since 1914 and even by the U.S. army in the punitive expedition against Pancho Villa

[John Sukey]

By the way, if my reading on the subject is correct, there were only TWO failures of low number Springfields and we fought WW1 with low number rifles

[Fred]

Oh, there were a Lot more than just TWO low number receiver failures John. Just for starters, please read Hatchers Notebook.

[Col. Colt]

John, both major US Armories STOPPED ALL M1903 RIFLE PRODUCTION DURING A HOT, SHOOTING WORLD WAR over this defect, instituted an investigation and changed their manufacturing practices and measurement equipment over a period of several months. Read Hatcher and the details become a lot more clear.

And there were more than a couple of dozen failures - with even a fatality, lost eye, etc, or two, as I recall. I think they really, really believed they had a problem of unknown magnitude...... Luckily, it ended up being not a terribly high failure rate, but it WAS a definite failure to each of the men holding those few that did fail.

I would like to believe that most of the LN rifles that were going to fail have already done so, and thus the existing pool of rifles is fairly safe. That doesn't mean Murphy can't still nail one of us, all the way back from 1917! If I had a LN, I would be seeking out one of the .22 conversion units for it - or shoot it only with a similar vintage Hollofield Dotter! CC

[PhillipM]

Col Colt, they continue to fail. On a Facebook 1903 group a poster took pictures of a 500k rifle with a left side receiver ring CRACK at a Cabella's gun room. Management said it was okay. Rick the Librarian saw the post, I can't find the pic or I'd put it up.