The Aircraft Carrier War

[Art]

The Men

The Japanese:

The Japanese military system, while it looked similar to European models and adopted much from them was also profoundly different. The officer class was more restrictive and the soldier, or sailor regardless of specialty was merely "The Sword of the Emperor." It was his entire value. In this scheme the vast majority of aircrews were enlisted men, including the pilots who were petty officers. They were also almost unbelievably well trained. Japanese pilots, especially were the benficiaries of intensive training that lasted for years and resulted in a corps of naval aviators of almost unparaled skill. The other crew members, middle seaters in torpedo planes and the radio operator/gunners were highly skilled and all were instilled through rigorous indoctrination in the defense of the God Emperor and the Empire of Japan. A quick word on radio operator/gunners. Gunner was their secondary role. All were proficient in Morse Code and were responsible for maintaining the communications link with the fleet. Unlike the U.S. Navy the highest ranking crew member of an aircraft was the aircraft commander regardless of job on his ship.

The bad news. The Japanese started the war with about 1,000 extremely well trained air crew who could not be replaced in that skill level if lost. Especially the pilots.

Speaking of radios. Much has been made of the practice of land based navy units removing their radios to save weight. This was out of the question in the carriers. Getting home was a big deal.

The ships were crewed by men trained through relentless hazing and beatings that could and did results in what anywhere else would have been an unacceptable number of suicides even in the Russian military. The Japanese sailors who crewed the Imperial Navy's ships were, resultingly, instantly obedient and incredibly brave. They were also pretty darned efficient while being also pretty darned inflexible.

The Americans:

American pilots were no slackers. The average American pilot of 1942 was extremely well trained and usually a long serving highly motivated veteran, Pearl Harbor motivated them more. Their back seaters, who had the same roles as Sons of Nippon were every bit as proficient as their Japanese equivalents. American training was more flexible, quicker and very good. It would pay off later.

The men who crewed the ships had higher mechanical skills when enlisted than the average Japanese equivalent which did make a difference, especially when training new people. American training while strict was also more humane, geared to not just to compliance but allowing a bit of innovation which also paid off.

The Japanese had an initial advantage but it was surprisingly short lived.

[barretcreek]

This is getting into 'thread drift' but we had a carrier war because we needed to control the seas in order to go island hopping. China wants Taiwan and to turn the westpac into their exclusive economic zone. Does this call for the same reaction?

[Art]

The Battles, 1942

The carrier strike forces fought four major battles in the central and southwest pacific in 1942. There was a lot of feeling out, both sides were pretty much operating without a net. The battles were also closely fought between roughly matched personnel using roughly matched equipment. American superiority in signals intelligence was a major factor.

The Japanese maintained a numerical superiority in carriers even after Midway.

The orders of battle will be attached to each post, they can be quite interesting.

[Art]

The Coral Sea

After Pearl Harbor the Japanese pressed their advantage, seizing the fuel resources that were there principal objective in Southeast Asia, and expanding far into the central Pacific. They also conducted a series of carrier raids that rendered the Royal Navy almost combat ineffective for a spell in the southwest pacific and Indian Ocean requiring the deployment of forces needed elsewhere.

The Japanese now plotted the next move. Thought was given to an invasion of Northern Australia, an idea so far fetched it was rejected almost out of hand. Instead it was decided to re inforce the big base at Rabaul by capturing Tulagi in the eastern Solomons and Port Moresby in New Guinea. Naval close air cover was to be provided by the CVL Shoho, distant cover by the big CVs Shokaku and Zuikaku and their escort screens.

Unfortunately for the Japanese we were reading their mail to the extent that we knew something was up and about where it would happen.

When the Yorktown and the Lexington with a surprisingly large screen showed up to contest the invasion it was a surprise to say the very least. The really bad news was the Americans were between the Japanese heavy cover CVs and the invasion force. The good news, this was also an opportunity to, at least partly correct the mistakes of Pearl Harbor.

Misidentifications limited the success of the first days fighting, but if you think you've found a carrier find an oiler and a destroyer, why waste the ordnance. So when a carrier contact turned out to be the detatched fleet oiler Neosho and Destroyer Sims, 36 D3Y Vals promptly demolished the Neosho and Sims before returning to base to re arm. The Americans had a better day finding the CVL Shoho. A quick note here on attrition. The Japanese were already starting to feel a pinch in planes and pilots. Hosho normally had an air group of 30. On this day she carried 18, 6 "Kate" torpedo planes and a mixed bag Zero and obsolete A5M2 "Claude" fighters. The US strike had been sent to find a carrier and they did. 53 Dauntless dive bombers and 22 Devastator torpedo bombers escorted by 18 Wildcats bored in. The Japanese had six Zeros and two Claudes in the Cap. The plight of the Shoho was near indescribable. The hits were almost uncountable. Even the Devastators looked good. Out of a crew of almost 900 less than 300 survived.

During councils of war at night both sides thought of attacking with their powerful screening forces. This was rejected due to the confusion of night fighting and the very high speed of fleet aircraft carriers making them very good at escaping.

The next day the fight resumed. The Americans launched a coordinated attack which resulted in three 1,000 pound bomb hits on Shokaku which put her out of the fight and in a yard for months. She almost foundered in a storm on the way back.

For their part the Japanese were now down half their strength but Zuikaku struck back hard. A "Hammer and Anvil" torpedo attack put two type 91s into Lexington. These were fatal, rupturing an avgas tank and eventually triggering explosions that sank the ship. The bomb hits were just window dressing. Yorktown took a 550 pound semi-armor piercing bomb (the heaviest a Val could carry) through the flight deck. This weapon penetrated four decks causing serious damage. As a side note; the battle between the US CAP Wildcats and Dauntless against the screening Zeros, while decided in favor of the "Zekes" was supposed to be one for the books.

While losses favored the Japanese, the battle was an American victory, the Rabaul offensive was thwarted and for the first time a Japanese offensive failed. An important issue, aircraft losses were about a wash but the Japanese lost enough more aircrew to matter.

[Art]

A little note. This has been a subject of interest of mine for a very long time. New stuff comes up all the time that modifies the narrative, for example and things that complicate the popular concepts formed in the war and immdiately after are sometimes, not exactly ignored, but not given enough attention.

I am aware that almost all of us are pretty knowledgeable of what happened in the Pacific in WWII, especially at Midway. After all, it was our daddy's war. Hopefully this stuff I've accumulated will result in in a little bit of new, different, or even contrary information.

I'd been thinking about putting this out for a while and finally de-lazied myself enough to do it. I admit it's been a little fun to write.

I had hoped to post NAVWEPS orders of battle but they defy hot linking. They provide some fascinating stuff.

[jon_norstog]

My ex's father was on a can (DD) in that battle. His ship wasn't hit too bad. He told me they spent two days picking up survivors, what was left alive in the water after the sharks had their banquet.

jn

[dogtag]

Excellent. Thanks Art.

I remember reading about later in the war with the Kamikazi attacks - the British Carrier (s) ?
had steel decks and suffered less than the American Carriers with their Wooden decks.

True ?

[Art]

Excellent. Thanks Art.

I remember reading about later in the war with the Kamikazi attacks - the British Carrier (s) ?
had steel decks and suffered less than the American Carriers with their Wooden decks.

True ?

That is true, post 1940. It would not always defeat a big AP bomb but the Japanese weren't dropping a lot of those in 1945. There was a trade off though, the Brit carriers carried only about 60% of the planes of their American or Japanese counterparts. They boosted that some with deck parking. Did I mention the Brits also invented the armored flight deck that everybody used now??? There is a Youtube channel called "Armored Carriers" about those ships, you might check it out.

The videos deal with the other side of the world but shows Luftwaffe's attempt to sink one of these carrier that was part of "Operation Pedestal." First short video is background to a long series.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9hjfzXhoYI

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ViAKdtarKZ4

[blackhawknj]

IIRC the Zero's long range was due a total absence of armor or any protection for the pilot.
In the Battle of the Phillipine Sea IJN Taihowas sunk by a single torpedo due to design flaws and poor damage control.

[Art]

95% poor damage control but that's a story for a later episode.

[Art]

IIRC the Zero's long range was due a total absence of armor or any protection for the pilot.

Just a word on this.

All Japanese naval aircraft were designed to achieve the longest possible range. This was part of the reason for the lightweight construction. They knew they would be flying over very long stretches of water.

Right after the landings on Guadalcanal the Japanese launched a strike looking for the American carriers of 27 very long range G4M Betty medium bombers escorted by Zeros of the elite Tainan Air Wing. The range was around 700 miles. That's further than London to Berlin. No other fighter at the time could possibly have flown that mission. They didn't find the carrier but attacked some transports covered by Wildcats of VF 5 From Saratoga. The Zeros shot down all 5 Wildcats for the loss of one bomber. No hits were scored on the transports. Without the Zero escort the Betty's would have been slaughtered.

Saburo Sakai speaking of the Zero's combat radius which their mechanics were able to tweak to almost 1,000 miles, said the luxury of never worrying about running out of fuel was of almost inestimable value in the vast reaches of the Pacific.

[Art]

Midway June 7, 1942

Reading their mail....again. The staff infighting over the actual objective is well known but it all panned out.

The Japanese had had a back pocket plan for the Midway operation. The Doolittle Raid put the cycle into motion and the Japanese would bet the whole pile on the operation. The whole pile had problems that would only become apparent later.

Once the objective was known Midway was loaded up with every available aircraft. The scouting force was especially heavy. The Navy supplied 29 PBYs, 25 search and 4 strike. The Army supplied 19 B17s, 4 D models and the rest new Es. The B17s were equipped with "Tokyo Tanks" which were fitted in the bomb bays increasing their range but cutting their bomb loads in half. This would be one of the few time the Fortress would fulfill its original intended role as maritime reconaisance/strike bomber. The Army also supplied four B26s that would be armed with torpedoes. The fighters were all Marines, 7 F4F 3 Wildcats and 14 Brewster Buffalos (these had originally been sent on the Wake Island relief mission via the Saratoga) which was aborted. The Marines also had a bunch of obsolescent SB2 dive bomber. Speaking of Saratoga, she took a torpedo on Jan 11 from the I-6, she was unlucky that way, and was on her way back from a west coast yard. Her air groups were at Pearl Harbor, though and would provide replacements for losses at Coral Sea and sail with the task forces for the coming fight.

The Japanese used their normal wide ranging plan and used every single carrier available, including the old light carrier Hosho which sailed with Yamamoto's battle line. The Japanese had nothing like enough front line aircraft for their air groups and many second line models were on carriers headed for the Aleutians and with the invasion force. Hosho, for example carried 11 B4Y biplane torpedo bombers. CVL Zuiho with the invasion force had a listed compliment of 30 aircraft, 12 B5N Kates and a fighter group made up entirely of 12 A5M Claudes. In the strike group only the two Hiryu class ships carried their full compliment of aircraft and Kaga was down 20% on her air group. The Japanese went into the fight seriously outnumbered.

First blood was actually drawn by a strike PBY which stumbled onto an oiler group and put a torpedo into one. The tanker did not sink.

The rest is mostly well known. The Japanese struck Midway and annihilated the Marine fighters that piled straight in almost to a plane, and then bombed and strafed everything in sight. All of the Midway aircraft were launched and the dive and torpedo planes attacked the task force and were shot to badly shot up by the CAP causing no damage. The Avengers lost five of their six aircraft in this their first fight. As is well known this totally unexpected turn caused the Japanese to order another stirke. More bombings developed from B17s and from Midway making it very difficult to spot and launch a strike. The US carriers decided that speed was of the essence and launched their planes piece meal. The torpedo planes went first and were subjected to a military execution by the Japanese CAP. It would be their last day in combat. The hand full of survivors being withdrawn for training purposes and taken out of service completely by 1944. Then the Dauntless bombers appeared and the rest is history. Only Hiryu survived and her Admiral, Tamon Yamaguchi decided retribution was more important than saving his carrier for later use and rather than opening the range to take advantage of the superior combat radius of his aircraft charged the Americans (very samaurai that) and put himself in range of a counter strike. His pilots fatally damaged the Yorktown, but the Americans struck back with every SBD they could scratch together and ended the Hiryu's run right then and there.

The Japanese raced to the scene at flank speed including the four carriers spread among the other groups but the Americans, their air groups depleted had, like Elvis, left the building. Consideration was given to taking Midway with the remaining forces and that could have been done but the high command (Yamamoto) considered it and then declared the option a "bad hand."

Some things not generally known:

This is the only battle in which US aircrew losses exceeded those of the Japanese. Total air crew losses for the Japanese were 110 (mostly from Hiryu), the good guys lost 94 in the carrier torpedo planes alone. The captains of the other carriers had their priorities straight and evacuated their pilots first. Aoki Kajiro, Akagi's skipper interviewed after the war asked about his aircrew losses said they were very lucky to have only lost six (Akagi's total losses were under 300.) The idea that losses were much higher which persisted for many years was based on visual evidence of battle damage and not numbers.

What difference would the Zuikaku have made? The "Auspicious Crane" was unscathed at the Coral Sea but her air group was severely depleted . The Japanese had a policy of not mixing air groups so she didn't sail, what difference She had a rated complement of 84 aircraft, what difference would maybe even 60 more aircraft made for the Japanese. We had no such issue with Yorktown.

After the battle the Japanese still had more carriers available, than the Americans, including 4 CV. Their rate increase would never keep up. In fact the case is well taken that even if we'd lost Midway our numerical advantage by late 1944 would have been overwhelming.

Japanese rigidity paid a big price in their defeat. American flexibility played a big part in their win, with the aid of providence.

[jon_norstog]

My ex's father was on a can (DD) in that battle. His ship wasn't hit too bad. He told me they spent two days picking up survivors, what was left alive in the water after the sharks had their banquet.

jn

I take it back. His ship was in the Coral Sea fight, but the shark story came later, when the Indianapolis went down. My bad...

jn

[Art]

A note on how naval aircraft casualties were counted.

In the Army a plane that, for example went down undamaged on a mission because of a mechanical problem or regained its base but had combat damage significant enough to write it off was an "operational loss" just as if it was lost in a training accident, it was not counted as a "combat loss." This obviously was a bit misleading though the "operational loss" might still server a potential purpose as a source of parts. The best example of how this could skew the numbers was the Regensberg-Schweinfurt raid in August 17, 1943. The 8th Air Force put up 376 B17s of which 60 were shot down. That's bad enough. Miller, in his excellent "Masters of the Air" exhaustive work on the bomber war in Europe reports that an even 100 returning aircraft were write offs that never flew again. That's over a 40% loss in equipment and verging on combat ineffectiveness.

The Navy was different. In a battle any aircraft lost for any reason during a battle was a combat loss, shot down, ditched regardless of the reason, deck accident, landed and pushed over the side even if still operational for deck operations purposes or down with the ship.

[blackhawknj]

Also I hsve read that at Midway the Japanese's most serious losses were not of pilots but of maintenance and engine room personnel.